SCIENCE
Inflation
Abstract. Inflation is the time evolution of a specified aggregate price index and, through that index, the purchasing power of nominal claims. This Science monograph investigates the conceptual, statistical, historical, mathematical, institutional, and empirical foundations of inflation across national and international economies. It distinguishes the measurement of price change from explanations of its causes and evaluates the interaction of monetary spending, real production, sectoral price shocks, nominal rigidities, expectations, fiscal financing, and policy credibility. The intellectual history extends from classical and monetary interpretations through the Phillips-curve debate, rational expectations, staggered contracts, New Keynesian price setting, and fiscal accounts of price-level determination. The study derives the principal price-index and inflation-rate identities, explains statistical problems of coverage, basket weights, substitution, owner-occupied housing, quality change, and international comparability, and assesses evidence from price microdata, expectations surveys, policy identification, and inflation forecasting. Historical hyperinflation and deflation are examined alongside pandemic-era inflation and the October 2026 global outlook, with forecasts clearly distinguished from realized observations. The analytical contribution is an integrated interpretation connecting the construction of aggregate price statistics to microeconomic adjustment, macroeconomic constraints, institutional reactions, and heterogeneous welfare effects. It specifies where accounting identities, calibrated mechanisms, and causal evidence warrant distinct types of conclusions. The work reviews 36 directly identified scholarly and institutional sources. It advances a reasoned synthesis of established research without claiming a new theory, an original econometric estimate, or external peer review.
Keywords: Inflation; price level; consumer price index; PCE price index; HICP; index-number theory; Phillips curve; monetary economics; monetary policy; price stickiness; expectations; inflation persistence; fiscal theory of the price level; exchange-rate pass-through; supply shocks; inflation inequality; hyperinflation; inflation targeting; economic history; econometrics; JEL E31
1. The Object, Scope, and Architecture of Inflation Science
Inflation is a sustained increase in the level of prices of a specified aggregate of goods and services, measured using an explicitly defined price index over an explicitly defined period. Its immediate accounting manifestation is a reduction in the purchasing power of one unit of the monetary denomination over that index basket. Scientific analysis asks why that price level moves, how its components change, what economic agents expect, how nominal contracts adjust, which groups incur gains and losses, and how public and private institutions respond. The object therefore has a statistical dimension, a microeconomic price-setting dimension, a macroeconomic general-equilibrium dimension, a distributional dimension, and an institutional historical dimension. The international CPI manual establishes why the statistical object must be specified before theories of its causes are assessed.
Let P_t denote a positive index number representing the price level in period t. The discrete inflation rate is π_t = 100(P_t/P_(t−1) − 1) percent. Log inflation is 100[ln(P_t) − ln(P_(t−1))] and approximates the discrete rate for small changes. For a consumer expenditure index, the inverse 1/P_t expresses the real purchasing power of one nominal unit in chosen index units. These identities convey measurement; they do not say whether money, productivity, demand, taxation, market power, supply bottlenecks, expectations or imported prices caused the movement. Causal explanations require additional hypotheses, data and identification.
The analysis must separate five distinct objects. First, the aggregate price level is a weighted index; second, relative prices are ratios of individual prices and can change even under zero aggregate inflation; third, expected inflation is a belief about a future price-index change; fourth, nominal income or interest is denominated in currency; fifth, real income or real interest is an inflation-adjusted object indexed to a particular basket and horizon. Confusion between these objects makes it impossible to evaluate wage adjustment, monetary transmission and welfare coherently. The official CPI overview explicitly defines the expenditure population underlying a commonly used consumer index, illustrating that every empirical price level has a coverage domain.
Inflation is distinct from an isolated increase in one commodity price. A temporary energy-price shock can raise measured headline inflation on impact and induce further cost and wage adjustments; its persistence depends on propagation and policy conditions. Disinflation means a decline in the positive rate of inflation; a price level can continue increasing throughout disinflation. Deflation is a negative aggregate inflation rate. Hyperinflation describes extreme, self-reinforcing price-level movements, but empirical classifications of its onset depend on the threshold and observation frequency selected. These distinctions are necessary for comparing short shock episodes with lasting monetary regime changes.
This monograph treats inflation as an international science with evidence drawn from official index methodology, historical source publications, theoretical economics, survey research, individual-price datasets, econometric causal designs and policy institutions. Its main argument is that the observable inflation path arises through an interaction among the composition of expenditure, sector-specific price resets, nominal expenditure, expectations, public financing and the institutional monetary regime. Each component has a separate evidentiary status; the synthesis is a reasoned organization of existing findings, without asserting a new named doctrine.
2. Intellectual History and the Formation of Inflation Theories
Early monetary thought connected sustained depreciation with money supply, trade, fiscal financing and the external value of currency. Classical quantity-theory reasoning later expressed the relationship between monetary expenditure, money holdings and nominal transactions. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, analytical attention expanded to industrial production, bank credit, unemployment, policy constraints and relative-price changes. The discipline developed as economists tried to explain why identical monetary expansions could be associated with different short-run output responses, why price adjustment was delayed, and why high inflation episodes sometimes ended abruptly.
The original empirical landmark of the modern Phillips-curve tradition was A. W. Phillips’s 1958 study of unemployment and money-wage changes in the United Kingdom, using historical wage and unemployment data from 1861 to 1957. It estimated a relationship involving nominal wage inflation, unemployment and the speed of labor-market change, rather than deriving a permanent universal trade-off between consumer-price inflation and unemployment. Replacing wages with consumer prices, making the curve structural and applying it unconditionally to another country would each require additional assumptions. The Phillips contribution remains central because it made labor-market tightness an empirically testable component of inflation dynamics.
Milton Friedman’s 1968 natural-rate argument emphasized that the response of employment and real wages depends on expectations and adjustment; agents eventually revise nominal demands after unanticipated price movements. In a separate rational-expectations approach, Lucas’s expectations and monetary neutrality study modeled how nominal surprises may alter real decisions when agents have imperfect information. These arguments transformed theories from correlations among aggregate time series toward explicit assumptions about beliefs, information and the rules under which decisions are made. Neither logically entails that all real effects disappear instantly, since contractual commitments and information frictions remain potential channels.
A major subsequent advance was the formal modeling of nominal rigidity. Taylor’s staggered-contract analysis showed how overlapping contracts can generate persistent aggregate responses, while Calvo’s staggered-price framework offered a tractable probabilistic mechanism for infrequent individual price resets. New Keynesian analysis later combined optimizing price setters, expectations and systematic interest-rate policy. Clarida, Galí, and Gertler’s monetary policy synthesis documents why credibility and commitment enter such a framework. The strength of these mechanisms must be tested against observations of prices and contracts rather than assumed from their mathematical convenience.
Monetarist, structuralist, Keynesian, New Classical, New Keynesian and fiscal-price-level interpretations have each illuminated different data-generating mechanisms. Structuralist and cost-push accounts emphasize supply bottlenecks, administered prices, sectoral conflict and imported essentials; demand-centered accounts analyze aggregate nominal spending relative to real capacity; institutional accounts examine fiscal capacity, wage-setting and credibility. Their empirical usefulness varies by episode and depends on whether the model distinguishes an initiating shock from the mechanism that keeps aggregate inflation persistent. Later chapters assess these mechanisms as testable conditional propositions.
3. The Mathematics and Measurement of Aggregate Prices
Inflation statistics begin with observed prices p_it for elementary items i, quantities q_it, expenditure shares and carefully chosen sampling frames. A fixed-basket Laspeyres-type index compares the cost of base-period quantities at current and base prices: P_L(t,0) = [Σ_i p_it q_i0]/[Σ_i p_i0 q_i0]. A Paasche-type index uses current quantities in both numerator and denominator. A Fisher index is the geometric mean of the Laspeyres and Paasche relatives. Chain indices connect adjacent periods, introducing responsiveness to expenditure shifts while generating their own path and revision issues. These are statistical definitions, not alternative causal theories of inflation. The 2020 CPI methodology explains why formula selection is part of the scientific meaning of every headline number.
The United States publishes both the CPI and the PCE price index. The BEA’s CPI–PCE reconciliation identifies four sources of divergence—formula, weight, scope and other factors—and specifies that the PCE index uses a Fisher-ideal formula while the CPI employs a modified Laspeyres formula. PCE expenditure covers purchases by and on behalf of the personal sector, including spending financed by parties other than households. The indices can therefore respond differently to medical spending, substitution and observed changes in consumption patterns. One index cannot mechanically replace another in empirical evidence or policy declarations.
Cross-country inflation comparison requires explicit harmonization of goods, transactions, taxation, owner-occupied housing and population coverage. Eurostat’s HICP methodological manual defines the standard underlying euro-area and EU consumer inflation. Housing illustrates the conceptual problem: mortgage payments, rents, owner-occupiers’ housing services and dwelling acquisition measure different economic flows, and including one of these in a price index entails a theory of what household consumption means. Consequently, published national housing inflation and harmonized HICP should not be combined as though they employed identical concepts.
Quality adjustment separates a change in a price quotation from a change in what is purchased. A larger computer memory capacity or medical service improvement may raise the observed ticket price while lowering a quality-constant price. New goods, disappearing products, outlet substitution, promotions, package size and changing distribution channels create further challenges. The official BLS consumer basket methods and the international index construction guide document the role of surveys, sampling and item replacement. Hedonic methods and matched-model methods can improve adjustment in their proper domains, but quality cannot be reduced to a universally observable scalar independent of consumer preferences.
An exact geometric decomposition demonstrates the effect of sectoral shares on headline inflation. Let g_i be a period-on-period price relative and w_i0 initial positive value shares summing to one. A one-step Laspeyres relative is Σ_i w_i0 g_i. Its percentage change is the weighted sum Σ_i w_i0(g_i−1) multiplied by 100. For illustration, consider two sectors with initial weights 0.3 and 0.7; if prices rise 20% and 2%, the one-period price change is 0.3×20 + 0.7×2 = 7.4%. This is an arithmetic construction, not an observed national inflation rate. If later weights change, the corresponding fixed-weight result differs from a chained estimate even with the same sectoral price trajectories.
Short-period, annualized and twelve-month rates answer different questions. If monthly inflation equals 1% in one month, multiplying by twelve gives an approximation to its annualized rate, whereas exact compounding yields 100[(1.01)^12−1] ≈ 12.68%. A twelve-month inflation rate instead measures the price index over an actual rolling twelve-month interval; it embeds multiple monthly realizations and base effects. Likewise, a 12-month headline slowdown may arise because an unusually large month drops out of the comparison, even if the most recent monthly rate is unchanged. Comparing observations requires a common horizon, seasonal treatment and index definition.
4. Inflation Indicators and Statistical Interpretation
Headline consumer inflation includes the items in a broad selected index; core measures typically remove volatile components such as food and energy or use alternative robust statistics. A trimmed mean excludes tails of the cross-section of price changes in each period, whereas a median measures the middle sectoral price movement under a specified weighting rule. These measures seek to diagnose persistent underlying trends; their superiority is conditional on forecasting horizon, loss function and shock structure. No core estimate is the unobserved “true” inflation rate. The 2024 IMF inflation study uses headline-versus-underlying decompositions as a diagnostic of post-pandemic dynamics, with methods and country coverage clearly bounded.
Producer prices, import prices, wages, export-price indices, construction costs and the GDP deflator measure different transaction domains. Producer-price changes can precede or follow consumer-price movements, depending on inventories, margins, intermediate input use and tax treatment. The GDP deflator covers domestically produced final output, including investment and government purchases, and excludes imports in its GDP accounting scope; consumer indices cover household expenditure including imports. Conflating these series creates spurious claims about “the” inflation rate. Equally, an increase in an asset price is relevant to balance sheets and monetary conditions but is not automatically an increase in consumer-price inflation.
Inflation expectations are also measurement constructs. Surveys ask households, firms or financial professionals about future prices; bond yields, inflation swaps and indexed securities contain compensation for expected inflation as well as risk and liquidity premia. The New York Fed’s Survey of Consumer Expectations provides individual-level distributions as well as summary statistics, while its survey methodology FAQ explicitly distinguishes the one-year, three-year and five-year questions. A market breakeven inflation rate therefore should not be treated as an unbiased survey-equivalent point estimate without a premium model.
Changes in expenditure shares can materially distort the lived comparison between a headline statistic and a household’s actual basket. In Inflation with Covid Consumption Baskets, Cavallo (2020) used pandemic transaction data to reweight official baskets and estimated higher pandemic-adjusted inflation than the official U.S. CPI, with analogous differences in several countries. The observation demonstrates a specified basket-construction problem during extraordinary shifts, not a blanket claim that official statistical agencies routinely miscalculate their mandate-based indices. A scientifically transparent comparison states the index population, period, basket weights and the welfare question to which the comparison speaks.
Empirical reports should register the timing of first releases and revisions, the choice of deflator, the seasonal adjustment vintage, uncertainty about quality adjustments and coverage of informal transactions. Statistical point precision should be evaluated against those substantive uncertainties. Index arithmetic can be exact while its economic representativeness is contingent. This distinction should shape both research claims and the public interpretation of any single inflation release.
5. Money, Nominal Expenditure, and the Quantity-Theory Tradition
The exchange identity MV = PY defines the product of a monetary aggregate M and its velocity V as nominal transactions or nominal output PY under consistent definitions. In log growth rates, approximately Δln P = Δln M + Δln V − Δln Y. This identity can organize observations but does not uniquely determine the direction of causation. Money can respond endogenously to credit demand and banking policy; velocity moves with payment technology, interest rates, liquidity preferences and instability; output is itself determined in part by nominal and real disturbances. Quantitative claims about long-run inflation require assumptions about these variables and the policy regime.
The classical long-run proposition that nominal expansions tend to affect the price level when real capacity and velocity are otherwise controlled concerns a sustained regime, not the magnitude of the immediate response to one change in a monetary balance sheet. Friedman’s monetary-policy address argued against exploiting a permanent unemployment–inflation trade-off and underscored expectations. Lucas’s 1972 information-based model supplied an additional reason to distinguish anticipated from unanticipated nominal changes. These contributions discipline long-run analysis, while allowing short-run non-neutrality under the specified frictions.
Modern monetary implementation often operates by choosing a short-term policy interest rate and supplying reserves elastically to meet the operating target. Credit aggregates, deposits and broad money respond to banks’ portfolios, payment demands and prudential constraints. The relevance of money growth must therefore be evaluated with a definition of “money,” a model of the demand for that asset and a plausible transmission mechanism. Comparing raw money growth across countries with different deposit structures, capital controls and inflation rates cannot provide a causal estimate by itself.
An expectations-adjusted Fisher equation links nominal and real returns: approximately i_t ≈ r_t + E_t π_(t+1), while the exact gross-rate identity is 1+i_t = (1+r_t)(1+π^e_(t+1)) under the assumed expected inflation concept. Ex post realized real return uses realized rather than expected inflation. A rapid nominal-rate increase may reflect a higher expected inflation component, tighter real policy or both. It follows that interest rates and monetary quantity indicators require joint interpretation alongside expectations, risk premia and inflation itself.
6. The Labor Market, Output Gaps, and Phillips Curves
A stylized expectations-augmented Phillips curve may be written π_t = E_(t−1)π_t + κ x_t + u_t, where x_t is an output-gap or labor-market-tightness indicator, κ is the conditional response coefficient and u_t collects other inflation determinants. The equation is a modeling device. Its coefficient and expectations term depend on estimation design, regime, selected price index, wage bargaining and microeconomic price-setting assumptions. The original Phillips wage–unemployment evidence concerns a specific historical relationship for wage rates; modern consumer-price Phillips curves require additional price-setting structure.
The distinction between a wage-level shock and a persistent wage–price feedback mechanism matters. Labor-market tightness can increase nominal wage demands, which enter marginal costs; firms may absorb some cost in margins or alter output rather than fully pass through prices. Workers also adjust wage requests to prices already paid. That backward reaction is not, by itself, evidence of an autonomous wage–price spiral. Identifying such a spiral requires showing repeated feedback that sustains inflation beyond initiating shocks, controlling for productivity, profits, imported inputs and expectations.
Bernanke and Blanchard’s pandemic-era U.S. inflation decomposition concludes that sectoral and commodity-price shocks were central to the initial U.S. 2021–22 inflation surge, while labor-market effects on wage and price inflation were more persistent within their model. The later cross-country eleven-economy comparison finds important shared shocks but varying relative roles and adjustment paths across jurisdictions. These findings argue against both the universal sufficiency of a simple unemployment gap and the complete irrelevance of labor markets. A shock can initiate inflation without dominating its eventual persistence.
Structural labor-market changes affect the interpretation of slack: participation, job switching, hours worked, skill mismatch, vacancy posting and wage-contract duration can move separately. Consequently, an unemployment rate does not completely summarize labor-market bargaining pressure. Statistical residuals in a Phillips-curve regression should not automatically be labeled “supply shocks” without direct measures of those shocks and attention to endogeneity. The inflation–slack relationship is an empirical object conditional on the time horizon and measurement choices, not a fixed historical law.
7. Price-Setting Microfoundations and Inflation Persistence
At the level of individual firms, the nominal price decision trades off expected profits, marginal cost, competitive responses, search frictions and the costs of revising a posted price. Under a Calvo specification, a fraction of firms is permitted to reset prices in each period; otherwise nominal prices are carried forward. The Calvo staggered-pricing framework illustrates how optimizing behavior with an adjustment restriction can translate temporary disturbances into aggregate inflation dynamics. The adjustment probability is a modeling assumption that requires empirical calibration, not a universal literal description of price management.
Taylor’s staggered-contract mechanism shows that overlapping nominal agreements can propagate an impulse across several periods, since agents respond at different dates. Standard New Keynesian Phillips curves then link inflation to expected future inflation and real marginal costs, subject to model-specific discounting and shock terms. Forward-looking expectations can accelerate adjustment if policy credibility changes quickly, but staggered contracts limit how rapidly all realized prices can move. Price rigidity and expectation revisions therefore interact rather than occupy independent causal compartments.
Micro data challenge the convenient assumption of identical price-setting frequencies. Bils and Klenow’s sticky-price evidence examined U.S. categories and found that price adjustments occurred more often than several early textbook calibrations supposed. Nakamura and Steinsson’s five micro price facts distinguish sales from regular-price changes and document strong heterogeneity across goods. These observations imply that models must specify whether price changes are measured with sales, substitutions and product turnover. A theory calibrated to a single average duration may mischaracterize both the aggregate persistence of inflation and the distribution of sectoral responses.
A useful analytical distinction separates state-dependent price setting from time-dependent price setting. Under time dependence, the opportunity to adjust is generated by a calendar or random hazard; under state dependence, a sufficiently large deviation from an optimal price can trigger an adjustment. Both can produce aggregate inertia, yet their response to a large cost shock need not be identical. The frequency and direction of price changes are themselves data that can help distinguish these mechanisms. For the analysis of inflation during rapid relative-price reversals, size, sign and frequency must all be studied.
Inflation persistence can also arise from backward-indexed contracts, habit in wage negotiation, sluggish beliefs and fiscal or exchange-rate policy. The sources differ in policy implications: an automatic wage indexation rule can transmit past inflation forward, while a credible monetary regime influences expected future pricing. Credibility alone cannot eliminate already contracted nominal payments or physical input shortages. This joint characterization allows microeconomic evidence to discipline macroeconomic policy interpretations without claiming that a single pricing friction explains every episode.
8. Inflation Expectations, Learning, and Communication
Inflation expectations influence spending, wage bargaining, debt contracting and firms’ decisions to reset prices. Rational-expectations models impose consistency between beliefs and the model’s probability law; adaptive learning models permit agents to infer that law from incomplete observations; information-rigidity models recognize delayed or selective acquisition of news. These theories generate distinct empirical predictions about forecast errors, disagreement and reactions to randomized information. In Information Rigidity and Expectations, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) find systematic evidence consistent with incomplete incorporation of information among forecasters.
Expected inflation should be treated as a distribution, not just a single central bank target. Different households face different expenditure baskets, experiences, media environments and financial contracts. Professional, household and firm expectations need not coincide; short-horizon expectations may respond strongly to visible food and fuel prices even when longer-horizon forecasts are comparatively stable. The New York Fed household expectations survey makes these heterogeneous beliefs observable, while the 2025 expectations research review warns that apparent aggregate stability may mask considerable agent-level lack of anchoring. That is a research conclusion from specified surveys and frameworks, not a direct measurement of every private belief.
Policy statements do not enter private decisions mechanically. The randomized communication study household policy-message experiment distinguishes responses to simplified information about the target, official statements and media presentations. In a separate Italian firm survey design, firm expectations and decisions uses randomized inflation information to identify effects on prices, credit demand and production choices in the sampled regime. These studies show how stronger identification than a raw survey correlation can be obtained, while effects can be contingent on the monetary regime, respondent attention and the information treatment.
Anchoring may be defined in several ways: a long-run mean near the target, low dispersion, low response to temporary shocks or stability of a full belief distribution. These are not equivalent. An economy may have median long-run expectations close to 2% while a substantial minority reports persistently higher or lower expectations. An index of disagreement cannot replace a test of mean reversion, and a market-derived breakeven includes risk and liquidity effects. Research should report which operational meaning of anchoring is actually supported by the data.
The mechanism connecting expectations to realized inflation is conditional on decision sensitivity. A household revising a survey answer need not immediately spend more; a firm changing a belief may retain a fixed price due to a contract or competition. The appropriate causal chain is information -> updated belief -> altered decision -> price or quantity response -> equilibrium feedback. Each arrow can be studied with experiments or quasi-experiments, and each requires care in extrapolation beyond the treatment population.
9. Fiscal Policy, Public Debt, and Price-Level Determination
Public finance enters inflation through government purchases, transfers, taxation, debt issuance, seigniorage and expectations of future primary fiscal balances. A temporary fiscal impulse can raise aggregate demand when capacity is constrained, but the effect on prices depends on households’ saving responses, central bank policy, supply elasticity, import leakage and the anticipated fiscal path. The government budget constraint governs feasible financing paths; by itself it does not identify whether adjustment occurs through taxes, spending, real growth, inflation or default. Distinguishing accounting consistency from equilibrium selection is essential.
Sargent and Wallace’s unpleasant monetarist arithmetic demonstrates that, in a model where fiscal choices eventually require monetary financing, attempts to contract monetary growth in the present can imply greater future seigniorage requirements. The argument is conditional on its policy coordination and financing assumptions. Leeper’s active–passive policy analysis further characterizes how monetary and fiscal reaction rules may yield different price-level equilibria. Fiscal dominance describes a configuration in which price stability is constrained by the financing demands of the public sector; it should be established through institutional and empirical evidence rather than inferred solely from a high debt ratio.
In fiscal-theory treatments, the real market value of nominal government liabilities is linked to the expected present value of future real fiscal backing, together with the model’s treatment of seigniorage and asset returns. Cochrane’s Fiscal Histories provides the interpretation in which news about expected fiscal surpluses can change the current price level. Barro and Bianchi’s OECD fiscal-inflation study tests a related channel using fiscal shocks, pre-pandemic debt and maturity information across OECD economies. These contributions are substantive competing interpretations of historical inflation, and their empirical scope does not turn a particular fiscal-price decomposition into an uncontested universal fact.
An illustrative surprise inflation calculation clarifies nominal debt redistribution. Suppose a state has a fixed nominal obligation of 110 units payable in one year, and the contract was priced expecting a price index of 105. If the realized index is 115, the real repayment in index-base units equals 110/115 rather than 110/105, about 0.9565 rather than 1.0476. The fall in the real value of that nominal claim is borne by its creditor before considering hedges, taxes, refinancing or interest changes. This arithmetic is exact under the stated index interpretation; it is not a welfare conclusion, because government creditors, taxpayers and expenditure beneficiaries have distinct exposures.
Fiscal and monetary credibility are jointly relevant when inflation risk affects bond yields. Unexpected inflation may temporarily reduce the real value of fixed nominal debt while subsequently increasing nominal borrowing costs and changing debt maturities. For debt issued in foreign currency, domestic inflation and depreciation can raise local-currency debt service rather than ease fiscal pressure. A research assessment must therefore identify currency denomination, maturity, indexation, public-sector consolidated balance sheets and rollover conditions before drawing policy implications.
10. International Inflation and Exchange-Rate Transmission
In an open economy, imports enter consumption and production directly. A change in an imported input’s local-currency price depends on the foreign-currency price and the nominal exchange rate, while final consumer pass-through also depends on market structure, distribution margins, contracts, taxes and substitutions. If the nominal exchange rate is expressed as domestic currency per foreign unit, its depreciation raises local-currency import prices mechanically for a given foreign quote. The actual aggregate CPI effect is reduced or amplified by the expenditure share, domestic supply response, inflation expectations and monetary regime.
Purchasing power parity relates national price levels to exchange rates under restrictive assumptions about traded items, transaction costs and nontradables. Its short-horizon failures should not be mistaken for logical inconsistency: services, housing, distribution costs and market-to-market pricing can move independently. Real exchange rates incorporate relative national price levels and therefore depend on deflator selection. A bilateral CPI-based real exchange rate and a GDP-deflator-based measure need not imply identical competitiveness changes.
An imported energy shock illustrates network propagation. The direct effect on household energy bills enters the headline basket with its official weight; intermediate energy use enters food, manufacturing, transport and services with delays; firms decide whether to absorb costs in margins or revise prices; workers negotiate wages after experiencing real-income losses. The IMF’s Great Tightening research chapter documents how energy dependence and price flexibility conditioned sectoral propagation in the recent inflation episode. A one-off commodity level change ceases to contribute to year-over-year inflation after its base comparison passes unless subsequent rounds continue; continued inflation requires renewed or propagated changes.
The cross-country analysis pandemic inflation in 11 economies finds large common supply and commodity forces but variable labor-market persistence and policy contexts. Thus global co-movement is compatible with different domestic inflation paths. Import dependence, exchange-rate regimes, fiscal support, labor institutions and central bank credibility alter the transmission of a shared disturbance. Comparing countries using only peak headline rates neglects these exposure differences and can misattribute policy effectiveness.
International inflation evidence also requires attention to capital controls, dollarized contracts, external debt, parallel exchange rates and statistical capacity. Imported-price impulses in an economy with a managed exchange rate are affected by reserve use and eventual adjustment; the observed official exchange rate may not price all transactions in an economy with restrictions. A comprehensive inflation science therefore combines cross-country macroeconomic data with trade-network composition and locally applicable measurement limitations, rather than assuming one global price index represents every national economy.
11. Inflation, Household Welfare, and Distribution
The welfare effects of inflation depend on how nominal incomes, nominal assets, liabilities, tax parameters, cash holdings and individual consumption baskets adjust. A nominal wage growth rate of 5% combined with a consumer price index increase of 8% implies an exact change in the indexed real wage of (1.05/1.08−1)×100 ≈ −2.78%. The real effect of inflation on a person receiving pensions, wage income, indexed transfers or capital income depends on each contract and its adjustment frequency. Headline CPI is only the relevant deflator if it approximates that person’s expenditures.
Inflation can redistribute real wealth even when aggregate real output is unchanged. Borrowers with fixed nominal-rate liabilities may gain from unexpected inflation relative to lenders; deposit holders with nominal returns below inflation may lose purchasing power; holders of inflation-indexed securities receive different protection. The model in Inflation as a Redistribution Shock shows why age, balance-sheet structure and heterogeneous adjustment can translate a nominal redistribution into persistent aggregate responses. Its welfare conclusion is conditional on the particular model, historical balance sheets and weighting of household welfare, rather than a universal claim that unexpected inflation benefits borrowers in every institutional setting.
Consumption composition creates a second distributional channel. Households spending relatively more on food, energy or rent may face a different effective price increase than households purchasing more durable goods, health services or travel. During the COVID-19 consumption shift, pandemic reweighted price baskets estimated that revised spending weights altered measured inflation. For distributional analysis, a household-specific cost-of-living calculation requires actual or representative expenditure data, a consistent reference period and attention to substitutions and changing quality. An inequality analysis based solely on a national headline figure misses these differential price changes.
Inflation also interacts with tax systems through nominal thresholds, unindexed capital gains, tax brackets and timing of public benefit adjustments. An indexed tax schedule prevents some nominal-bracket effects but may not fully neutralize income recognition, asset revaluation or delays. In the public sector, surprise inflation changes real tax receipts, real debt payments and the cost of public procurement at different speeds. These effects must be separately assigned rather than summarized as a single “inflation tax.”
When price stability is evaluated normatively, the relevant social objective includes output and employment stabilization, distribution of real losses, price dispersion and the costs of transition. A disinflation program may lower expected future inflation but temporarily raise unemployment or squeeze leveraged firms, depending on transmission and credibility. Those costs should be compared under an explicit counterfactual policy path. Inflation levels alone do not identify welfare; a defensible welfare estimate specifies preferences, exposure, the distribution of outcomes and the time horizon.
12. Firms, Price Dispersion, and the Real Economy
Firms experience inflation through input costs, output demand, inventory valuation, working capital, interest rates and competitive conditions. A producer purchasing inputs today and collecting receivables later is exposed to the difference between the inflation already reflected in purchases and the inflation anticipated when it fixed its sales contracts. A firm with strong market power may pass cost changes through differently from a small price-taking supplier. The marginal-cost, demand and contract channels must be separated before attributing an observed consumer-price increase to profits or wages.
When all prices cannot reset together, unexpected nominal demand can alter relative prices, markups and output. High inflation often increases the frequency of price adjustment; micro data in Five Facts about Prices show that the frequency of price increases changes with aggregate inflation while decreases have different behavior in the studied period. Empirical evidence about regular prices must be distinguished from temporary discounting because a sale price and a posted regular price have different roles in contracts and consumer expectations. The study’s U.S. sample does not establish that all developing economies share the same micro price-reset frequencies.
Inflation can make the price system noisier when agents struggle to distinguish aggregate nominal changes from changes in scarcity, quality or local demand. This idea appears in Lucas’s relative-price signal framework, where nominal surprises and limited information have real consequences. However, precise real effects depend on financial markets, information distribution and production structure. Price dispersion is itself measurable, but its welfare cost cannot be calculated by equating dispersion with inflation: a larger dispersion can reflect genuine changes in relative scarcity rather than nominal inefficiency.
Accounting practices alter measured profits under rising input prices. Historical-cost inventory methods, depreciation schedules, nominal interest deductions and tax treatment may record gains or losses that differ from real economic returns. In international comparisons, accounting standards and tax laws are additional sources of measured profitability divergence. The empirical question is whether profits are leading, accommodating or following an inflationary process, and identification demands credible sectoral prices, quantities, cost structure and competitive benchmarks.
A supply shock propagates through input-output networks but the final price response can be smaller or larger than the direct input-cost arithmetic. Firms may absorb costs temporarily, consumers may substitute products, and higher nominal expenditure may sustain price changes. The IMF energy-pass-through estimates highlights cross-country differences in headline transmission. Studying individual firm behavior alongside aggregate inflation avoids the fallacy that every observed price change has the same macroeconomic cause.
13. Monetary Institutions and Inflation Stabilization
Central banks seek to influence inflation primarily through expected future policy, short-term interest rates and a transmission chain involving credit conditions, asset prices, aggregate expenditure, exchange rates and wage/price setting. Their authority and instruments are defined by law, institutional arrangements and operating procedures, and their effectiveness depends on fiscal and financial circumstances. A change in a policy rate is a stance change only relative to expected inflation, the neutral real interest rate and market conditions. As the New Keynesian policy review emphasizes, commitment and credible expectations alter optimal policy responses under nominal rigidity.
The Federal Open Market Committee’s August 2025 strategy statement maintains the United States’ longer-run 2% inflation objective measured by the PCE price index. The amended statement describes a balanced approach across a broad range of conditions, and the 2020 language aiming to compensate persistently below-target inflation with a period moderately above target is absent from its current 2025 text. The earlier 2020 framework statement remains historically relevant to research on average inflation targeting but should not be cited as the current wording of FOMC strategy. Policy targets must always be given with date, index, averaging horizon and institutional source.
The ECB’s 2025 monetary strategy statement reaffirms a symmetric 2% target over the medium term, using the harmonized measure of consumer inflation. Its strategy explanation treats moderate temporary fluctuations and large sustained deviations differently while recognizing the relevance of expectations and the effective lower bound. The ECB also monitors owner-occupied housing cost estimates as supplementary indicators rather than representing that all such costs are already fully included in the published HICP. Comparing ECB and Federal Reserve numerical targets requires their distinct index definitions and legal mandates to remain visible.
Inflation-targeting regimes must respond to trade-offs under supply shocks. Immediate elimination of a temporary imported energy price increase could imply sharp adjustment in domestic demand; allowing a prolonged rise in expectations can induce further persistence. A medium-term target supplies flexibility, yet any decision should be anchored in a forecast distribution and explicit welfare and financial stability risks. Instrument independence, data quality and communications are means for implementing such decisions; their effects are institutional and empirical questions, not guaranteed from statutory language alone.
The interest-rate lower bound, quantitative easing, balance-sheet normalization and forward guidance have different balance-sheet and expectations channels. A central bank can control the remuneration and supply terms of reserves but does not independently set all bank credit or fiscal financing conditions. Credibility is supported by consistent decisions, sound public finance and reliable statistics. Fiscal policies threatening long-run solvency can undermine monetary commitments in the regimes considered by fiscal-monetary arithmetic and policy-regime equilibrium analysis.
14. Historical Regimes: Deflation, High Inflation, and Hyperinflation
Historical comparison is valuable precisely because inflation regimes differ in fiscal financing, monetary arrangements, output shocks, nominal indexation, financial development and political credibility. Metallic standards, central bank lending regimes, wartime finance, exchange pegs, modern floating currencies and monetary unions each impose different feasible adjustment paths. An inflation episode should be described by a dated series, the corresponding index concept, policy rule, fiscal institutions, real output and exchange arrangements. Without these components, a historical analogy becomes narrative resemblance rather than causal inference.
The interwar central European cases studied in Sargent’s Ends of Four Big Inflations connect hyperinflation stabilization with dramatic changes in fiscal and monetary arrangements, while cautioning against a mechanical inference that the exact same intervention will work in every future regime. The relevant causal question is which institutional changes made a noninflationary financing path credible. Stopping a hyperinflation cannot be reduced to announcing a desired inflation rate if fiscal commitments and payment systems remain incompatible with that goal.
The 1970s advanced-economy inflation experience involved oil shocks, wage and price institutions, monetary accommodation, fiscal circumstances and evolving public beliefs. The subsequent disinflations show that inflation persistence, credibility and real economic activity interact across years. Friedman’s expectations-centered monetary analysis supplied a theoretical explanation for the eventual adjustment of wage and price expectations; modern empirical work tests how quickly those expectations changed and whether output sacrifices differed with institutional context. Historical correlation of tightening and inflation decline cannot by itself establish the independent causal contribution of each instrument.
Deflation is a distinct regime, especially when nominal debts are fixed and real debt burdens rise with falling prices. Real interest rates can become elevated when nominal policy rates face a lower bound, constraining stabilization. A secular decline in the price of an individual technology is different from broad debt-deflation with falling nominal revenue. The distinction matters for countries experiencing rapid productivity improvements, long-term demographic change or banking distress.
Contemporary history includes the post-2020 inflation episode, which cannot be understood from the 1970s analogy alone. The U.S. pandemic inflation study and international pandemic comparison identify significant supply, energy and consumption-composition shocks together with later labor-market persistence in specified samples. Comparison across these episodes should examine the international context, expectations evidence, duration, monetary credibility and relative-price changes, rather than selecting only the peak annual headline percentage.
15. Empirical Identification, Forecasting, and Scientific Reproducibility
Scientific explanations distinguish descriptive decompositions from causal effects. An index decomposition assigns observed arithmetic contributions to items or sectors; it does not identify counterfactual prices absent a shock. A regression associating money growth and inflation can be jointly driven by policy response, output shocks or money-demand changes. A study claiming the causal effect of monetary tightening must isolate exogenous variation in policy from the endogenous response to expected inflation, activity and information revealed by policy announcements.
Structural vector autoregressions, local projections, event studies, proxy instruments, narrative shocks and randomized information treatments offer different identification strategies. Their conclusions depend on exclusion restrictions, timing assumptions, instrument relevance, stability and measurement choices. Sims’s multivariate monetary-policy study documents that some monetary-policy time-series responses are hard to reconcile with simple causal stories, including the problem of interest-rate rises predicting higher near-term inflation. The price puzzle may reflect omitted information about central-bank forecasts, financial market conditions, commodity prices or genuine transmission complexity; a model needs explicit tests to discriminate mechanisms.
Forecasting is a separate task from structural causal inference. A forecast can be accurate while its coefficients are unsuitable for a policy counterfactual, and an identified policy effect can coexist with poor near-term forecasting ability. Stock and Watson’s inflation forecasting research show why changing trend and volatility may favor simple time-varying benchmarks relative to fixed-coefficient multivariate models. Any forecast evaluation must state its horizon, rolling or real-time training scheme, revision treatment, baseline, loss metric and uncertainty bands. A retrospective forecast using subsequently revised data is not a genuine real-time forecast.
Experiments can improve identification of expectation transmission. The firm information treatment in Italian firm decision experiment and randomized household communications in monetary communication experiment identify particular information-induced changes in beliefs and decisions. Their internal validity does not automatically identify how a nationwide interest-rate rule would affect equilibrium prices. External validity requires attention to the monetary environment, exposure, sample selection and network interactions among untreated agents.
Reproducibility demands clear transformation from raw price quotations to indices and from policy announcements to shocks. Each empirical dataset should record sampling frames, index revisions, seasonal treatment, missing values, deflators, data access conditions and version information. A published paper without accessible confidential microdata can still be examined through disclosed estimation procedures and public summary results, but such examination is not identical to full data replication. This monograph distinguishes verified publisher abstracts, examined primary text, reported studies and its own mathematical examples. It reports no invented country estimates or simulations.
16. Contemporary Global Inflation Research Through November 2026
Research after the pandemic has moved toward the interaction of demand stimulus, global supply chains, energy exposure, household reallocation, labor-market tightness and expectations. The strongest results are not one universal causal percentage but source-specific decompositions with heterogeneous countries, counterfactual assumptions and sample windows. Bernanke and Blanchard’s 2025 peer-reviewed U.S. study attributes most of the initial U.S. pandemic-era price acceleration to price shocks while emphasizing greater persistence of wage-related labor-market effects. Blanchard and Bernanke’s 2024 cross-economy study extends the method across 11 economies and finds shared supply disturbances together with national differences.
The IMF’s October 2024 research chapter examines the broadening and subsequent decline in inflation, including the role of energy intensity and bottlenecks. It is informative about the sample period and models used, and its causal attributions should not be mechanically transferred to unobserved 2026 outcomes. Further research on expectations has sharpened a measurement dispute: central-bank targets can remain credible as institutional statements while many households’ short-run or even longer-term survey expectations depart from them. The 2025 expectations review argues that selective attention remains a material challenge for monetary communications.
A current global outlook must be timestamped. In the October 2026 World Economic Outlook, the IMF projects world headline inflation of 4.7% for calendar 2026 and 4.1% for 2027, based on a specified statistical cutoff of October 1, 2026. The companion October 2026 world database reports annual-average consumer price inflation as distinct from end-period inflation. These numbers are institutional projections as of publication, not realized final-year observations. The world aggregate is also a constructed statistic covering economies with markedly different inflation histories, currencies and data systems; it cannot describe the consumption cost faced by any one household.
The near-term frontier includes identification of energy and food shocks amid geopolitics, adjustments to trade fragmentation, fiscal risk, wage-setting shifts and differences between low- and high-inflation regimes. Automated pricing and algorithmic tools may change the timing and responsiveness of prices, but claims about their effect on aggregate inflation demand causal evidence. Monetary policy analysis increasingly requires cross-sectional expenditure and balance-sheet data alongside aggregate inflation releases; technological novelty by itself establishes neither a new inflation regime nor a new theory.
The central empirical conclusion is that model performance is regime-dependent. During low and stable inflation, expected long-run changes may provide useful anchors; during major relative-price shocks, cross-sectional movement and basket shifts may dominate the near-term headline. When fiscal credibility deteriorates, models abstracting from fiscal backing may omit a decisive equilibrium determinant. In all cases, using a coherent definition of the price index and the identification target is a prerequisite for substantive conclusions.
17. Open Problems, Methodological Limits, and Research Priorities
The first frontier concerns real-time measurement. Households change where they shop, which goods they buy, product quality, service intensity and housing arrangements in response to shocks. Scanner, web-scraped and card-transaction data may provide faster signals but change population coverage and require defensible quality adjustment. The COVID consumption-basket study demonstrates how rapidly changing expenditure weights can alter comparisons. An ideal statistical research program would publish parallel official-weight and experimental current-weight series, sampling uncertainty and the precise reason for differences without collapsing distinct index objectives into one figure.
The second frontier concerns causal separation of simultaneous nominal and real shocks. Production bottlenecks, government spending, credit supply, wage contracts, imported prices and monetary announcements can react to the same underlying disturbance. A well-identified analysis requires heterogeneous timing, instruments, cross-country exposure contrasts or experiments, followed by robustness checks against anticipation and endogenous response. The policy-identification tradition remains a warning against assuming an instrument change is automatically an exogenous policy shock.
The third frontier is how agent-level belief distributions aggregate into economy-wide pricing. The information-rigidity evidence and recent expectations assessment suggest that representative-agent rational expectations may obscure important differences in attention, uncertainty and spending responses. Economic significance depends on the share of decisions taken by each group, how their price-setting or wage-bargaining activity interacts and whether information treatments propagate beyond studied participants. Long-term expectations should be assessed by both surveys and independent market indicators with their premia explicitly modeled.
The fourth frontier concerns fiscal credibility and political institutions. The fiscal analyses in monetary–fiscal equilibrium research and cross-OECD fiscal evaluation indicate that sustainable debt financing and price-level adjustment can be jointly determined in specific regimes. Empirical progress requires measuring expected primary balances, sovereign risk, debt duration and exchange denomination, and comparing predictions with monetary interpretations under transparent restrictions. The fact that a fiscal explanation fits one episode does not make monetary transmission irrelevant, nor does a credible inflation target eliminate fiscal constraints.
The fifth frontier is distributional measurement and welfare. Heterogeneous nominal contracts and consumption baskets imply that two populations with identical measured headline inflation can experience different real-income and wealth effects. The nominal-balance-sheet redistribution study provides a basis for studying these mechanisms. Stronger research will integrate household expenditure, assets and liabilities, tax-benefit schedules and wage-reset timing, then test policy counterfactuals rather than assigning a single welfare sign to aggregate inflation.
An additional methodological limit is source accessibility: official documentation, published abstracts and accessible original papers have different information content from licensed article full texts or proprietary microdata. This work interprets the verified accessible evidence, discloses the resulting limits and leaves any full restricted-data replication to researchers with legitimate access. It offers formal derivations and an original interpretative synthesis, not a new named law, causal experiment, or falsely claimed empirical discovery.
18. Integrative Analytical Synthesis
The evidence supports an ordered account of how aggregate inflation becomes observable and persistent. Its first layer is statistical: the price index maps many individual transaction prices and quantities into one convention-dependent aggregate. Its second layer is microeconomic: firms, workers and households alter nominal prices and contractual decisions in response to costs, demand, information and expectations. Its third layer is macroeconomic: monetary expenditure, fiscal financing, real capacity and external trade determine general-equilibrium constraints and feedback. Its fourth layer is institutional: policy rules and credibility shape beliefs about future nominal adjustment. Its fifth layer is distributional: actual welfare and real balance-sheet effects vary by exposure and adjustment speed. This ordering is an original analytical synthesis of established concepts rather than a separately named model.
These layers answer different questions and should be tested using different data. The index layer asks what was measured; the price-setting layer asks which prices changed and why; the macroeconomic layer asks what constrained the nominal-real allocation; the institutional layer asks why agents expected particular future paths; the distributional layer asks who gained or lost after those paths materialized. A theory that ignores one layer can remain useful within its defined domain. For example, quantity-theory accounting helps discipline the long-run relation of nominal and real magnitudes, whereas individual-price data explain short-run heterogeneity. The methodological error arises when a partial domain claim is generalized to every inflation episode without the missing assumptions.
A transparent decomposition of causal inquiry can be stated without inventing new theory. Given a headline inflation observation, first reconstruct it from official sectoral weights and price relatives. Second, distinguish external price impulses, domestic marginal costs and nominal expenditure pressures. Third, estimate expectation revisions and contract-reset mechanisms with appropriate identification. Fourth, condition those results on monetary and fiscal reaction functions. Fifth, map changes into heterogeneous real incomes and nominal balance sheets. This sequence does not assign fixed numeric contributions, since causal components interact and identification varies across episodes. Its purpose is to preserve the logical difference between calculation, mechanism and policy inference.
The synthesis clarifies four recurring disputes. “Inflation is monetary” can be a long-run proposition about nominal determination, but it is incomplete as a description of the timing and composition of immediate consumer price changes. “Inflation is supply-driven” can characterize the initiating shock while leaving the persistence mechanism open. “Inflation is caused by wages” requires evidence that wage setting moves prices conditional on productivity, demand, expectations and margins; reverse causality is common. “Inflation is caused by fiscal deficits” requires a specified regime and financial backing mechanism. Treating each sentence as a conditional research proposition yields clearer tests than choosing one label in advance.
The science of inflation thus has a stable methodological center: define the index and horizon, distinguish levels from rates, identify initiating impulses, trace nominal propagation, model beliefs and public financing, and estimate heterogeneous consequences. Its enduring scholarly objective is to explain how observable price systems and collective economic expectations coevolve under real scarcity and monetary institutions. That objective spans mathematics, econometrics, monetary economics, industrial organization, public finance, economic history, household finance and international macroeconomics while preserving the autonomous disciplinary identity of Inflation.
Conclusion
Inflation is an observable and economically consequential process whose measurement depends on an explicit statistical price-index construction. A price index combines selected prices and weights. Its rate of change is mathematically defined, but the index alone cannot identify the causes of its movement or its distributional consequences. Sound inflation science therefore starts by specifying the population, expenditure domain, observation horizon, weights, formula, treatment of changing quality, and statistical vintage. Differences among CPI, PCE, HICP, producer-price measures, and the GDP deflator have substantive economic meaning.
The history of inflation theory demonstrates the cumulative importance of monetary and fiscal constraints, real activity, price-setting frictions, expectations, and economic institutions. The exchange identity provides an accounting framework subject to definitional consistency and endogenous adjustment; monetary neutrality and nominal non-neutrality are theoretical propositions with different horizons and assumptions. Phillips-curve relations depend on expectations, shocks, labor-market conditions and policy credibility. Microeconomic evidence of heterogeneous price changes constrains how aggregate rigidity may reasonably be specified. Fiscal backing and debt valuation can matter profoundly in designated regimes, and open-economy shocks operate through exchange rates, supply chains and nominal expenditure responses. None of these mechanisms can be assigned a universal numerical share of inflation across all economies and historical episodes without identified empirical evidence.
The research literature also shows why expectations and credibility are economic variables in their own right. Beliefs about the future price level influence wages, saving, nominal contracts, and pricing, while observed inflation and policy communication revise those beliefs. Households, firms and professional forecasters possess different information and respond differently. Aggregating their responses requires knowledge of decision weights, attention, contractual horizons and market institutions. A forecast, moreover, remains conditional on the date and information set of its production. The IMF's October 2026 world-inflation figures analyzed here are projections rather than a substitute for eventual national statistical observations.
Welfare cannot be inferred directly from a single inflation statistic. Household purchasing power depends on the actual consumption basket, income adjustment, public transfers and balance-sheet denomination. Surprise inflation changes the real value of nominal debt and assets; the incidence depends on who holds which claims and when. Empirical assessment requires heterogeneous income, expenditure, asset, debt and wage-contract data. Efforts to stabilize inflation must therefore be studied together with their employment, fiscal, credit and distributional consequences rather than evaluated by the headline index in isolation.
The monograph's synthesis identifies five mutually connected dimensions of the field: measured index construction, underlying price decisions, economy-wide nominal-real constraints, institutional expectations and reactions, and heterogeneous real outcomes. This is an organizing interpretation of the examined literature, with no proposed named doctrine. Future research will be strongest where detailed price and household data, explicit macroeconomic regimes and credible causal designs are combined without treating correlations, forecasts, identities or simulations as experimental findings. Inflation retains an autonomous place in economic science because its central problem joins statistical aggregation, decentralized price setting, nominal institutions, historical regimes and the evolution of purchasing power across society.
References
-
Barro, Robert J., and Francesco Bianchi. 2023, revised 2025. “Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020–2023.” NBER Working Paper 31838. DOI: 10.3386/w31838
-
Bernanke, Ben S., and Olivier J. Blanchard. 2025. “What Caused the US Pandemic-Era Inflation?” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 17 (3): 1–35. DOI: 10.1257/mac.20230195
-
Bils, Mark, and Peter J. Klenow. 2004. “Some Evidence on the Importance of Sticky Prices.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (5): 947–985. DOI: 10.1086/422559
-
Blanchard, Olivier J., and Ben S. Bernanke. 2024. “An Analysis of Pandemic-Era Inflation in 11 Economies.” NBER Working Paper 32532. DOI: 10.3386/w32532
-
Calvo, Guillermo A. 1983. “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework.” Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (3): 383–398. DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(83)90060-0
-
Cavallo, Alberto. 2020. “Inflation with Covid Consumption Baskets.” NBER Working Paper 27352. DOI: 10.3386/w27352 Later published in IMF Economic Review 72 (2024): 902–917.
-
Clarida, Richard, Jordi Galí, and Mark Gertler. 1999. “The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective.” Journal of Economic Literature 37 (4): 1661–1707. DOI: 10.1257/jel.37.4.1661
-
Cochrane, John H. 2022. “Fiscal Histories.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 36 (4): 125–146; NBER Working Paper 30328. DOI: 10.3386/w30328
-
Coibion, Olivier, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2015. “Information Rigidity and the Expectations Formation Process: A Simple Framework and New Facts.” American Economic Review 105 (8): 2644–2678. DOI: 10.1257/aer.20110306
-
Coibion, Olivier, and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2025. “Inflation, Expectations and Monetary Policy: What Have We Learned and to What End?” NBER Working Paper 33858, revised July 2025. DOI: 10.3386/w33858
-
Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Michael Weber. 2019. “Monetary Policy Communications and Their Effects on Household Inflation Expectations.” NBER Working Paper 25482, revised 2021. DOI: 10.3386/w25482
-
Coibion, Olivier, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, and Tiziano Ropele. 2018. “Inflation Expectations and Firm Decisions: New Causal Evidence.” NBER Working Paper 25412; published Quarterly Journal of Economics 135 (1), 2020: 165–219. DOI: 10.3386/w25412
-
Doepke, Matthias, and Martin Schneider. 2006. “Inflation as a Redistribution Shock: Effects on Aggregates and Welfare.” NBER Working Paper 12319. DOI: 10.3386/w12319
-
European Central Bank. 2025. An Overview of the ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy. June 2025.
-
European Central Bank. 2025. The ECB’s Monetary Policy Strategy Statement. June 30, 2025.
-
Eurostat. 2024. Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP): Methodological Manual—2024 Edition. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. DOI: 10.2785/055028.
-
Federal Open Market Committee. 2020. Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, amended August 27, 2020 (historical strategy).
-
Federal Open Market Committee. 2025. Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy, amended effective August 22, 2025.
-
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. n.d. Survey of Consumer Expectations: Frequently Asked Questions. Accessed November 16, 2026.
-
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. n.d. Survey of Consumer Expectations: Main Survey and Data. New York. Accessed November 16, 2026.
-
Friedman, Milton. 1968. “The Role of Monetary Policy.” American Economic Review 58 (1): 1–17.
-
International Labour Office, International Monetary Fund, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, European Union, United Nations, and World Bank. 2020. Consumer Price Index Manual: Concepts and Methods. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. ISBN 978-1-48435-484-1.
-
International Monetary Fund. 2024. “The Great Tightening: Insights from the Recent Inflation Episode.” World Economic Outlook, October 2024, Chapter 2.
-
International Monetary Fund. 2026. World Economic Outlook Database, October 2026: World Indicator Data.
-
International Monetary Fund. 2026. World Economic Outlook: Resilience Under Strain, Urgent Choices. October 2026. Statistical information cutoff October 1, 2026.
-
Leeper, Eric M. 1991. “Equilibria under ‘Active’ and ‘Passive’ Monetary and Fiscal Policies.” Journal of Monetary Economics 27 (1): 129–147. DOI: 10.1016/0304-3932(91)90007-B
-
Lucas, Robert E., Jr. 1972. “Expectations and the Neutrality of Money.” Journal of Economic Theory 4 (2): 103–124. DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(72)90142-1
-
Nakamura, Emi, and Jón Steinsson. 2008. “Five Facts about Prices: A Reevaluation of Menu Cost Models.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 123 (4): 1415–1464. DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2008.123.4.1415
-
Phillips, A. W. 1958. “The Relation Between Unemployment and the Rate of Change of Money Wage Rates in the United Kingdom, 1861–1957.” Economica 25 (100): 283–299. DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0335.1958.tb00003.x
-
Sargent, Thomas J. 1982. “The Ends of Four Big Inflations.” In Inflation: Causes and Effects, edited by Robert E. Hall, 41–98. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
-
Sargent, Thomas J., and Neil Wallace. 1981. “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic.” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 5 (Fall). DOI: 10.21034/qr.531
-
Sims, Christopher A. 1992. “Interpreting the Macroeconomic Time Series Facts: The Effects of Monetary Policy.” European Economic Review 36 (5): 975–1000. DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(92)90041-T
-
Stock, James H., and Mark W. Watson. 2007. “Why Has U.S. Inflation Become Harder to Forecast?” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 39 (s1): 3–33. DOI: 10.1111/j.1538-4616.2007.00014.x
-
Taylor, John B. 1980. “Aggregate Dynamics and Staggered Contracts.” Journal of Political Economy 88 (1): 1–23. DOI: 10.1086/260845
-
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. n.d. What Accounts for the Differences in the PCE Price Index and the Consumer Price Index? BEA FAQ 555. Accessed November 16, 2026.
-
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. n.d. Handbook of Methods: Consumer Price Index—Overview. Washington, DC: BLS. Accessed November 16, 2026.