RESEARCH DOSSIER
The Economics of Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Reform
Abstract. This research dossier develops an economic account of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting reform architecture established in 2013–2015 and its subsequent implementation. It examines the allocation of multinational taxable income, hybrid mismatches, controlled foreign companies, financing restrictions, preferential regimes, treaty-related mechanisms, transfer pricing, reporting and dispute resolution. Its analytical contribution is an instrument-specific evaluation of behavioral substitution, fiscal incidence, real activity and administrative cost. Selected official statistics and research findings are distinguished from hypothetical calculations and causal inference. The study reports a structured synthesis rather than an original empirical estimate.
Keywords: base erosion; profit shifting; BEPS reform; multinational taxation; fiscal incidence; economic substance; country-by-country reporting; international tax coordination
The Economic Object of Reform
Base erosion and profit shifting reform is the coordinated alteration of the institutions that determine the location, measurement and taxation of multinational corporate income. The economic object is the allocation of a common enterprise's taxable income among tax jurisdictions, the incentives that govern this allocation, and the consequences of changing those incentives. It encompasses the cost of organizing cross-border businesses, the fiscal capacity of governments and the strategic responses of enterprises and tax administrations. Its institutional starting point is the 2013 OECD/G20 action plan, followed by the 2015 package and the subsequent implementation of its instruments.
A multinational enterprise is a network of legal entities with differing functions, assets and risks. A consolidated financial result is not itself the taxable base of each entity. The taxable base is formed through domestic rules, transactions between related entities, treaty provisions, recognition of deductions and income, and adjustments imposed by tax administrations. Profit shifting changes the geographic distribution of taxable income, and in some circumstances the total amount recognized, without an equivalent change in consolidated pre-tax economic income. Real investment, employment and market activity can also change in response to tax incentives. The empirical investigation must distinguish these processes.
Reform is a change in the feasible set of institutional and organizational arrangements. Its effects cannot be inferred from the adoption of a legal provision alone. A formally effective measure may induce substitution into another contractual channel, change an investment decision, increase the probability of enforcement, or transfer a dispute from one jurisdiction to another. A workable economic assessment follows these adjustments jointly and compares them with a plausible counterfactual.
Measurement and the Fiscal Baseline
Tax base erosion is measured relative to a specified benchmark. A benchmark may be historical tax receipts, taxable income without a particular arrangement, or an estimated distribution of profit under alternative policies. These benchmarks identify different objects; comparison requires specifying the tax rate, period, consolidation perimeter and treatment of losses. A revenue gap is not a stock of recoverable cash.
The OECD Action 11 report estimated global annual corporate income tax losses associated with BEPS of USD 100–240 billion at 2014 levels. The interval describes a model-dependent estimation exercise. It does not establish the gain from the subsequent reforms, the liability of any particular company or the distribution of potential receipts among countries. A credible evaluation reports uncertainty and explains how the benchmark changes if a jurisdiction modifies both rates and deductions.
In a hypothetical two-country example, an enterprise earns consolidated pre-tax income of 100 monetary units. If 60 units are recognized in a jurisdiction taxing at 25 percent and 40 in a jurisdiction taxing at 5 percent, total tax equals 17. If 20 units move from the higher-rate jurisdiction to the lower-rate jurisdiction while consolidated income is unchanged, total tax falls to 13. Reassigning those 20 units would restore four units of receipts in the aggregate at constant rates. This mechanical calculation assumes complete recognition, immediate payment and no behavioral adjustment, and is not an empirical estimate.
For evaluation, write expected receipts as the sum across jurisdictions of effective marginal tax treatment multiplied by the relevant base, with separate terms for payments relating to earlier periods. The reform's estimated effect depends on movements in each term. Deferred taxation, loss carryforwards, timing changes and different currency conventions complicate the comparison. A change in tax receipts over time is therefore not directly interpretable as the return from anti-shifting enforcement.
Institutional Architecture and Implementation
The 2015 package implements the 2013 agenda through instruments of different legal and economic kinds. Actions 5, 6, 13 and 14 are minimum standards within the Inclusive Framework architecture; other recommendations and treaty changes have different mechanisms of adoption and application. A meaningful implementation variable specifies the particular instrument rather than assigning a single treatment date to the entire package.
The Action 1 final report situated direct-tax BEPS concerns within the broader tax challenges of digitalization, including consumption taxation. It did not make all digital business models equivalent to profit shifting. The Action 12 final report offered recommendations for mandatory disclosure regimes to provide tax administrations with timely information about potentially aggressive arrangements. Such disclosure complements, but is analytically distinct from, the periodic group-level country-by-country reporting under Action 13. Its potential effects depend on the design, timing and administrative use of disclosures.
The BEPS Multilateral Instrument was adopted on November 24, 2016, entered into force on July 1, 2018, and began producing its first effects on January 1, 2019. These dates describe the instrument's overall history, not uniform effective dates for all bilateral treaty relationships. Treatment of an enterprise depends on the relevant jurisdictions, covered agreements, matching choices and applicable effective dates.
A country-year indicator for BEPS membership is consequently a weak measure of actual exposure. Exposure varies with a group's financing, organizational forms, years of account, treaty network, and whether it meets specified thresholds. Researchers should construct instrument-specific panels with legal effective dates, transition periods and affected populations. Announcement effects need separate analysis because an anticipated rule may induce reorganization before formal application.
Coordination reduces the ability to exploit gaps between jurisdictions only to the extent that implementation actually covers the relevant mismatches. Administrative capabilities are complementary. A jurisdiction with detailed rules but limited access to usable group data may have less effective enforcement than a jurisdiction with a simpler framework and an established audit capacity.
Hybrid Mismatches and Classification
Hybrid mismatch arrangements exploit differences in the classification of entities, instruments or payments. A deduction may be recognized in one jurisdiction while the corresponding receipt is not included in taxable income elsewhere, or a single economic cost may give rise to deductions in more than one jurisdiction. The Action 2 recommendations target these effects, including imported mismatches that are transmitted through other arrangements.
The source of the advantage is the interaction between rules rather than the tax rate of one country in isolation. Suppose a payment of 10 is deductible by a payer with a marginal tax rate of 25 percent and creates no corresponding current inclusion in the recipient jurisdiction. The immediate tax benefit at the payer is 2.5 units. If the deduction is denied, the mechanical benefit disappears. The group may respond by changing its financing contract, reducing leverage or shifting toward a different investment structure. Its adjustment costs and the new allocation of risk are part of the reform's consequences.
Empirical analysis should identify the prior mismatch and the affected mechanism rather than using the gross value of hybrid instruments as a proxy for tax savings. A legitimate commercial instrument can have different tax treatment in different systems. The economic question is whether the interaction creates an advantage under the specified benchmark and whether the adopted response removes it without imposing excessive costs on ordinary financing.
A reduction in mismatched deductions is a direct intermediate outcome; tax receipts, investment and disputes are downstream outcomes. Combining them in a single indicator risks confounding the instrument's immediate operation with the response of the enterprise.
Controlled Foreign Companies and Deferral
The Action 3 design recommendations concern controlled foreign company rules, which may bring specified foreign income into the tax base of a shareholder jurisdiction under defined conditions. Their economic significance arises from the treatment of retained earnings abroad, the location of mobile activities, and the relationship between source-country taxation and taxation in the jurisdiction of ownership.
The present value of a future tax liability differs from an immediate liability. In a hypothetical example, a liability of 10 units payable after five years has a present value of approximately 7.84 units at a discount rate of five percent. Moving the liability forward increases its present value by approximately 2.16 units. The example illustrates timing value only; actual CFC systems have exclusions, foreign tax credits, income classifications and conditions that must be specified before calculation.
A rule that eliminates a deferral advantage may alter ownership chains, distributions, retention policies and the location of substantive activities. The response depends on the available organizational alternatives and the treatment of foreign tax. An empirical study needs to distinguish changes in repatriation behavior from changes in underlying production or investment.
An assessment of CFC reform also requires the joint treatment of residence and source jurisdictions. Additional current inclusion can change the distribution of receipts between governments without increasing total tax by the same amount. A fiscal objective at the national level need not coincide with the objective of reducing the global tax disadvantage associated with arrangements lacking economic substance.
Interest Deductions and Capital Structure
The Action 4 final report addresses the erosion of taxable income through interest and other financial payments. Rules linking deductible net interest to an earnings measure constrain the value of locating debt in relatively high-tax entities. The 2026 implementation statistics report interest limitation rules in 89 jurisdictions, compared with 67 in 2019. These are implementation counts, not estimates of prevented shifting.
In a stylized earnings-based restriction, taxable earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization equal 100 and the applicable deduction ratio is 30 percent. With net interest of 45, 30 units are currently deductible and 15 are outside the current limit. At a marginal rate of 25 percent, the immediate tax effect is 3.75 units before carryforward rules, other restrictions or behavior. For a business whose earnings subsequently decline, the same debt contract can produce a different restriction even without additional borrowing.
Debt allocation is both a real financing decision and a potential tax-planning mechanism. The pre-BEPS study by Büttner and colleagues reports that thin-capitalization rules reduced internal borrowing, with responses involving external debt. Its period and legal instruments precede Action 4; it supplies evidence of a substitution channel rather than a causal estimate of the 2015 reform.
An evaluation should measure internal debt, external debt, total leverage, interest expense, unused deduction capacity, the timing of deductions and changes in investment. A restriction on one channel can induce movement into another. Groups with volatile earnings may face a materially different cost from groups with stable earnings. Heterogeneity is central to the incidence of the rule.
The fiscal effect is strongest when the restricted deduction would otherwise have reduced tax in a high-rate jurisdiction without equivalent taxable inclusion elsewhere. The economic cost can be greater when a restriction affects financing of productive but temporarily unprofitable investment. These effects require differentiated measurement, not an inference from the nominal deduction limit.
Preferential Regimes and Economic Substance
The Action 5 framework addresses preferential regimes through transparency and the relationship between benefits and substantive economic activity. A lower statutory tax rate, targeted tax benefit and an arrangement that separates income recognition from underlying functions create different economic questions. The relevant comparison is the behavior induced by the particular relief and the conditions attached to it.
An enterprise may adapt by relocating employees, acquiring qualifying assets, altering research expenditure or discontinuing a preferential arrangement. The relocation of real activity can be a primary intended mechanism of reform rather than an incidental response. The associated changes in wages, public receipts and operating costs determine whether the result is efficient for the enterprise or for competing jurisdictions.
A preferential regime's classification under an international review process is an institutional outcome. Its economic outcomes require separate measures: the mix of eligible and ineligible income, changes in effective tax burdens, the geography of employment and investment, and changes in the distribution of public receipts. The classification alone cannot establish the net welfare effect.
Countries compete for economic activity through multiple instruments. Restricting one form of tax preference may shift competition toward grants, infrastructure or different tax bases. The cost and benefits of the substitute instrument belong in the evaluation of longer-run policy responses.
Treaty Benefits and Market Presence
The Action 6 minimum standard targets inappropriate treaty benefits, including arrangements that exploit treaty networks in ways inconsistent with the applicable standard. The Action 7 recommendations address artificial avoidance of permanent establishment status. Both measures affect the location of recognizable tax rights but operate through different legal mechanisms.
Treaty benefits can change the after-tax return on a cross-border investment by modifying the withholding tax on specified income. Consider a hypothetical payment of 100 subject to withholding of 15 under direct investment and five through an intermediate structure. The immediate difference of 10 is a gross withholding effect. It is not necessarily the total tax advantage because residence-country tax and credits, intermediate expenses and contractual risks may offset it.
An additional condition for treaty eligibility increases the cost of arrangements whose value depends on preferential access. Enterprises may replace an intermediary, reorganize functions or accept a higher withholding burden. Where an intermediary provides substantive commercial services, its continued use can be economically rational independently of the treaty benefit.
Changes affecting taxable market presence raise separate questions about the attribution of income to the relevant activity. A change in whether a permanent establishment exists does not mechanically determine the amount of attributable profit. One needs the relevant factual and legal framework, the functions performed and the allocation procedure. This dossier evaluates incentive and incidence mechanisms rather than determining legal eligibility for specific taxpayers.
Treaty-based treatment is bilateral. Researchers should construct exposure at the treaty-pair level where possible, rather than assuming that all firms resident in one country are equally affected.
Transfer Pricing and the Allocation of Income
The Actions 8–10 final reports revise guidance concerning the alignment of transfer pricing outcomes with value creation. The economic challenge is to distinguish the return associated with actual functions, assets and risks from contractual labels that attribute income elsewhere. Intangible assets, integrated business activities and intra-group services often lack close observable comparables.
A single consolidated group result may be consistent with more than one plausible allocation of joint income. When high-value activities are performed in several jurisdictions, the productivity contribution of each function cannot always be separately observed. Contractual allocation, ownership and operational control form parts of the evidence; uncertainty in attribution remains an empirical and administrative cost.
Expected enforcement changes the return on aggressive positions through the probability of adjustment, the amount of potential tax, the cost of defense and the possibility of relief from double taxation. An enterprise may respond before any actual adjustment occurs if these expected costs alter its planning decisions. Tax administrations' resources and access to information shape the effective enforcement intensity.
An empirical indicator of transfer pricing enforcement should distinguish initial adjustments, final agreed adjustments, amounts collected and amounts reallocated after mutual agreement procedures. A larger proposed adjustment is not necessarily additional net revenue if it is reduced or matched by relief abroad. Measuring gross proposed adjustments as fiscal gains is therefore misleading.
Reporting, Information and Administrative Capacity
The Action 13 reporting architecture combines documentation at group and entity levels with country-by-country reporting. Private country-by-country reporting changes the information available for risk assessment. It does not convert consolidated or jurisdictionally grouped accounting variables into a complete formula for tax liability.
The information mechanism is endogenous to enforcement capacity. A report identifying a divergence between reported profit and employees may direct a tax administration toward further investigation. Whether the divergence indicates an abusive arrangement depends on the industry, assets, risks, financing, accounting treatment and relevant law. The ratio is a risk signal; it is not a finding of liability.
The OECD 2026 country-by-country statistics chapter reports that 109 jurisdictions had implemented mandatory reporting for fiscal year 2023; the published statistics cover reports filed in 60 headquarters jurisdictions and more than 9,400 multinational groups. This is materially incomplete coverage. Group eligibility and reporting rules define the population; disclosure safeguards and aggregation restrict which inferences can be made from the published statistics.
A comparison between aggregate profits and aggregate employees is not a direct estimate of shifting. The same ratio can increase because a population of groups changes, because profits in a sector recover, because exchange rates fluctuate or because intangible-intensive businesses expand. A credible study controls for these possibilities and identifies the observation unit and covered accounting period.
Information is valuable when it changes decisions at a reasonable cost. The return from reporting depends on the ability to process data, select cases, coordinate with partner authorities, and avoid unnecessary audits. A small administration may gain from risk-screening tools but face relatively high fixed implementation costs. These heterogeneous benefits and costs are central to a comparative assessment.
Empirical Evidence on Private Country-by-Country Reporting
The institutional abstract for Joshi's 2020 study reports evidence from the EUR 750 million revenue threshold and an approximately one- to two-percentage-point increase in consolidated GAAP effective tax rates among affected firms. Its reported evidence regarding income shifting is more limited. The estimate concerns the studied population and design, not all enterprises or the total fiscal return from BEPS.
Hugger's working paper reports an increase in effective tax rates of approximately one percentage point, without a corresponding increase in total tax payments in its analysis. The revised working paper's introduction and results discussion distinguish the increase in the consolidated tax-rate measure from the absence of an increase in tax payments. It also reports excess observations immediately below the reporting threshold; these patterns make the treatment assignment and selection process consequential. Differences between effective rates and payment amounts matter because the denominator and the level of profits can change along with tax expense. The paper's Orbis-based analysis excludes zero-tax jurisdictions. In a cross-border-only subsample, the reported effect on the high-tax-country share of profits is not statistically significant. These limits prevent treating the estimated response as a general result for all offshore jurisdictions or all multinational profit shifting.
De Simone and Olbert's study reports real allocation responses associated with private disclosure, including capital and labor responses in European jurisdictions with stronger preferential regimes. This finding reinforces the distinction between the location of accounting income and the location of productive activities. Disclosure may alter both real activity and reporting incentives.
These results provide mechanism-specific evidence. Their reported magnitudes concern different outcomes, populations and designs and should not be averaged as if they were repeated measurements of a common parameter. The revised Hugger working paper and a repository version of the De Simone–Olbert study are available for further examination; the Joshi result is reported at abstract depth. The discussion retains the original study populations and outcome definitions and does not independently reproduce the estimators, standard errors or robustness checks.
A threshold can provide a quasi-experimental opportunity if observations near it are comparable and corporations do not manipulate the assignment variable in a way that invalidates the design. Bunching, merger activity and differential industry trends require explicit consideration. A difference-in-differences study additionally requires evidence supporting its counterfactual trends and an appropriate treatment of varying implementation dates.
Disputes, Double Taxation and Institutional Coordination
The Action 14 final report concerns more effective resolution of disputes. When two jurisdictions attribute the same income to themselves, the combined burden can exceed what either jurisdiction intended under its own rules. The economic cost includes liquidity requirements, uncertainty, legal expense, management time and the possibility of delayed investment.
The OECD mutual agreement procedure statistics report the worldwide 2024 transfer-pricing cohort for cases received from 1 January 2016 or the year of joining the Inclusive Framework, with an opening inventory of 2,782, 1,265 starts, 1,067 closures and an ending inventory of 2,980. The arithmetic reconciles as 2,782 + 1,265 − 1,067 = 2,980. The increase in inventory is 198 cases. This is a specific administrative series, not an estimate of unpaid tax or the number of affected firms worldwide.
The stock-flow identity provides a useful diagnostic: an ending inventory equals the opening inventory plus incoming cases minus closed cases, subject to corrections in the reporting system. Closure rates measured against starts may rise even as a substantial backlog persists. Duration and age distribution therefore matter in addition to counts.
A reform that increases enforcement activity can raise dispute starts in the short run. Its eventual success may depend on whether corresponding procedures resolve the conflicts efficiently. Evaluating only the increase in assessments would omit the associated costs and relief. A joint evaluation considers final tax, dispute duration and the certainty of the allocation of tax rights.
Identification, Treatment and Counterfactuals
BEPS implementation is not a single, homogeneous intervention. Different instruments affect different enterprises and operate through different channels. For each empirical investigation, the treatment variable should represent exposure to the relevant rule and the comparison group should represent a plausible alternative trajectory.
An investigation of interest restrictions may use the prior share of related-party debt or expected deduction capacity to characterize exposure. An investigation of reporting may use eligibility thresholds and the relevant accounting period. A study of treaty changes can use covered bilateral relationships and matching dates. Results from one type of treatment are not automatically transferable to another.
An event-study design requires pre-treatment diagnostics and attention to anticipation. A difference-in-differences design must account for staggered introduction and heterogeneous treatment effects. A threshold design requires scrutiny of manipulation, the continuity of other determinants and the sensitivity of findings to bandwidth choices. These are evaluation requirements, not claims that the cited empirical literature satisfies all of them.
Simultaneous reforms are a material identification difficulty. Changes in domestic rates, international financing conditions, corporate reporting, global demand and other tax instruments may coincide with the implementation date. The counterfactual should represent these influences rather than attributing the entire observed change to the focal rule.
A well-specified empirical result therefore reports the estimand, treated population, comparison population, timing, uncertainty and assumptions. It also identifies whether the outcome is a current accounting measure, final tax payments, a legal assessment, a measure of real activity or a risk-screening indicator.
Fiscal Effects, Behavioral Substitution and Welfare
The fiscal effect of a reform comprises a mechanical component at unchanged activity and organization, a behavioral component from changes in taxable bases and contractual structures, and a timing component from the recognition and settlement of liabilities. For international comparisons the distribution across governments is as important as the total.
Suppose a reform would increase annual receipts by four units at unchanged behavior, but enterprises respond by reorganizing in ways that lower the mechanically expanded base and reduce the gain by one unit. If additional annual public administration costs equal half a unit, net additional fiscal resources before other effects equal 2.5 units. All inputs are hypothetical. If three units of private compliance costs arise, these should be recorded separately rather than mechanically subtracted from public receipts: the resulting fiscal and social accounts answer different questions.
Incidence depends on market structure, the availability of alternative investment locations, the elasticity of capital supply, labor mobility and the treatment of domestic competitors. An additional corporate tax obligation may reduce shareholder returns, change wages or prices, alter entry decisions or reduce rents. The distribution cannot be inferred from the statutory payer.
Policies affecting multinational groups can change competitive conditions for firms lacking comparable organizational flexibility. An evaluation should consider whether the reform reduces distortions among different forms of enterprise. It should also investigate whether fixed documentation and dispute costs create disproportionate barriers to expansion by smaller firms approaching relevant thresholds.
The welfare calculation includes the value of additional publicly financed services, changes in economic distortions, the cost of administration and compliance, domestic and foreign incidence, and the reduction or creation of uncertainty. A precise welfare estimate requires assumptions and evidence beyond the implementation and abstract-level research reviewed in this synthesis.
The Relationship to Subsequent Minimum-Tax Reform
Subsequent global minimum-tax coordination changes the incentives associated with differences in effective taxation. Its operation can interact with the instruments examined here through the treatment of deductions, tax credits, substance and the location of income. The global minimum tax is a distinct policy object requiring its own formal examination.
The present dossier concerns the 2013–2015 reform architecture and implementation of its principal instruments. A post-minimum-tax observation can reflect both the earlier measures and later reforms. A study of BEPS must identify the period during which its treatment effect is measured and distinguish subsequent policy interactions.
When effective tax differentials narrow, the benefit associated with reallocating taxable income may change, while the cost of reporting, treaty eligibility and resolving disputes remains relevant. The administrative infrastructure established through earlier reforms can also influence the operation of subsequent instruments. These are possible interactions, not quantified causal claims.
A Comparative Evaluation Protocol
A defensible comparative evaluation begins with an instrument inventory: the rule, jurisdiction, legal effective date, treatment population, transitional arrangements and administrative conditions. It then defines the economic exposure, the behavioral channel and the observable outcome. These layers should be linked through explicit records rather than inferred from a generic adoption indicator.
For each instrument, an evaluation should preserve the original source and period of administrative statistics, record their coverage and reconcile stock-flow quantities where relevant. Monetary data require a consistent treatment of currencies, price periods, fiscal years and consolidated entities. Missing data should remain missing rather than being silently coded as absence of reform.
An empirical analysis should state what its counterfactual would predict in the absence of the measure. It should test relevant alternative explanations and, where possible, compare the operation of the same instrument across administrative and market settings. Mechanism-level evidence provides a basis for synthesis, but the effects need not be homogeneous or additive.
A policy evaluation can be organized around five dimensions: effective implementation, behavioral response, fiscal incidence, real activity and institutional cost. Each dimension requires its own evidence. A positive implementation count does not determine the direction or size of the other four dimensions. This framework allows reform instruments to be compared without collapsing their distinct economic functions into a single score.
Research Limitations
This archival reconstruction is a structured economic synthesis based on the official publication pages, selected official statistical chapters and accessible research abstracts identified in the references. The underlying 2015 reports and the cited journal articles have not all been read in full during this reconstruction. No original econometric replication, comprehensive systematic review, country-level legal concordance or independent peer review is claimed.
The reported figures retain their reference periods and source definitions. The numerical scenarios are explicitly hypothetical and do not estimate the causal effect of any national or international rule. The available evidence supports a conceptual distinction among channels and selected documented findings; broader quantitative inference requires additional primary-source examination.
The exact original manuscript from the earlier writing session has not been recovered. This version is newly composed from the established research identity and chosen evidence. It is a new research edition of the established dossier identity. Its evidence consists of the specific documents and passages identified here; the historical version remains unrecovered.
Conclusion
Base erosion and profit shifting reform changes the institutional mechanisms by which multinational income is measured, allocated and taxed. Its economic significance is found in the behavioral adjustments made by firms and administrations after those mechanisms change. The 2015 package established a differentiated architecture addressing classification mismatches, deferral, financing, preferential regimes, treaty access, taxable presence, transfer pricing, information and dispute resolution.
An assessment of the reform requires a separate account of implementation, behavior, fiscal incidence, real activity and institutional cost. Evidence about one dimension cannot establish the results of the others. Fiscal baselines must distinguish model-based estimates of pre-reform losses from observed receipts, accounting tax measures and causal estimates of the reform's subsequent effects.
The central conclusion is that coordinated reform can change the conditions under which cross-border tax advantages arise and the allocation of the resulting costs and benefits. Establishing the magnitude and distribution of these consequences requires instrument-specific evidence, a defensible counterfactual and attention to substitution and administrative coordination. The economic evaluation is consequently a continuing comparative task grounded in documented mechanisms and empirically identified outcomes.
References
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