RESEARCH DOSSIER

Economic Substance and Corporate Location

Abstract. Economic substance concerns the actual performance of corporate functions in particular jurisdictions. Corporate location comprises the geographical allocation of production, employment, assets, management, ownership and financial claims. This monograph investigates the interaction between these dimensions in multinational enterprises, focusing on the economics of offshore structures, tax incentives, substantial-activities requirements and the statistical measurement of international investment. It synthesizes selected economic research, official statistical standards and institutional documents, contrasting the responses of real activity and reported profits. The analysis establishes that policies linking favorable tax treatment to actual activity can encourage both the consolidation of financial structures and the relocation of productive or organizational resources. The resulting economic incidence depends on the mobility of specific functions, the supply of complementary resources and the corporate alternatives available across jurisdictions. Evaluation requires function-specific indicators, decomposition of investment positions and research designs that capture diversion across locations. The work provides an analytical synthesis rather than new econometric estimates or a novel named theory.

Keywords: Economic substance; corporate location; multinational enterprises; offshore economics; foreign direct investment; tax competition; substantial activities; intellectual property; corporate taxation; investment measurement; economic incidence; causal inference

Introduction: the geography of the corporation

The multinational enterprise organizes productive processes, contractual relationships and financial claims across jurisdictions. Corporate location consequently denotes several economic decisions made within one organization. A plant can be situated in one economy, an intellectual property right owned in another, financing supplied through a third and governance performed in a fourth. The resulting geographical structure determines the movement of goods, services and capital; it also influences which communities receive wages, tax payments and orders for complementary services. An enterprise may expand its presence in an economy without moving its ultimate ownership, and it may transfer ownership without increasing productive capacity there.

Economic substance is the sustained performance of economically consequential functions through resources, personnel and effective decision-making in a specified jurisdiction. Its assessment requires identification of the relevant activity, the responsible enterprise unit and the period of observation. This economic definition serves the analysis of location. Particular statutes establish their own criteria, exemptions and consequences, which may diverge across industries and jurisdictions. The existence of legal economic substance is a conclusion under those rules; the magnitude of local economic contribution is a separate research question.

The central question of this dossier is how tax systems and substance requirements change firms' choices about the location of productive and organizational capabilities, as distinct from the location of claims to income. A subsidiary's registered address is evidence of a legal relationship. Its payroll, capital expenditure, employees' responsibilities and actual control of operations disclose other dimensions. Each indicator is meaningful when classified according to the economic process it measures. A single aggregate measure of inward investment cannot adequately describe the entire structure.

The literature on international production supplies an initial explanation for the creation of foreign operations; international taxation adds the consequences of jurisdictional differences in the treatment of corporate income; statistical methodology determines what an observer can establish from reported data. These bodies of work are mutually informative. Their integration makes it possible to assess the global offshore system as a geography of distributed economic functions, rather than treating incorporation and production as interchangeable events.

Research questions, scope and method

The investigation considers four related questions. What resources and actions constitute an economically meaningful corporate presence? Which margins of corporate choice respond to differences in taxes and regulatory obligations? Under what circumstances do substance requirements change the location of production rather than the accounting location of profits? How should the consequences be measured at enterprise, jurisdictional and international levels?

The method is an analytical synthesis of selected published economic research, working papers, official statistical standards and institutional primary documents. Research identified in the evidence record includes results from multinational-enterprise panels, foreign-direct-investment decompositions, country-by-country reporting, tax-notch analyses and studies of intellectual property regimes. The dossier distinguishes the implications of formal economic reasoning from observed correlations and from designs that seek to identify causal responses. Numerical illustrations are constructed for explanation; they are not measurements of particular enterprises.

The time horizon encompasses the modern literature on multinational location and the institutional evolution from the OECD harmful-tax-practices agenda through BEPS and the global minimum tax model rules. Official implementation reports are cited as dated observations rather than a comprehensive statement of the law on a current date. The empirical literature emphasized here has particular coverage of US and internationally active firms. Extrapolation to smaller businesses, countries outside the samples, and contemporary digital enterprises requires additional evidence.

The research belongs to Offshore Economics. Corporate profit shifting enters the analysis as an economic incentive and an outcome, but comprehensive estimation of worldwide shifted profits belongs to the associated profit-shifting dossier. The legal interpretation of individual economic substance statutes, treaty eligibility and administrative remedies belongs to Offshore Law. The objective here is to establish a coherent account of firm behavior, local resources, measurement and welfare.

Source selection is purposive rather than a registered systematic review. Some academic publications were accessible through author or publisher abstracts and institutional records; conclusions drawn from those records remain at the level the accessible evidence supports. No confidential corporate microdata were obtained, no original econometric estimates were produced, and no claim of comprehensive replication or priority in theoretical innovation is made.

Corporate location as a set of economic decisions

A corporation's location may refer to legal incorporation, fiscal residence, its center of management, operational establishments, assets, workforce, markets, funding entities or ultimate beneficial ownership. These locations can coincide in a domestically integrated business and diverge in a multinational structure. Fiscal residence and the existence of a taxable permanent establishment are legal determinations whose criteria differ; an economic investigator must preserve that distinction when using administrative records.

The enterprise group coordinates these units through management and control. The relevant decisions have different horizons. Choosing where to build an industrial facility creates a relatively durable commitment. Hiring engineers builds organizational capital over time. Purchasing a patent changes the ownership of a claim to future income, potentially without changing where research is conducted. Financing choices can often be altered more rapidly than physical production. Each margin has its own costs of adjustment.

The statistical unit must match the question. An entity-level dataset describes registered enterprises and their transactions, while an establishment dataset is better suited to the geography of production. Enterprise-group accounts capture consolidated performance but eliminate transactions internal to the group. Country-by-country information aggregates the entities associated with group operations in a jurisdiction. Each perspective is incomplete on its own.

Consider a business that transfers its treasury subsidiary between countries while retaining the same supply chain. If the records show a decline in foreign equity positions in one country and an increase in another, that observation identifies a financial relocation. Evidence of new treasury personnel and actual decision authority would establish an additional movement of organizational activity. Evidence of new production capacity would require a different set of records. The three events may occur together, independently, or with substantial lags.

These distinctions are central to the classification of offshore structures. A remote financial holding company can perform a real ownership and investment function, even where its local workforce is small. A multinational service center can have many employees while important strategic decisions occur abroad. A large operating enterprise may make little use of external finance. Treating these cases as a single continuum of authenticity confuses the nature, scale and location of functions.

Foundations of multinational location

The choice to serve a market by exporting or establishing local operations depends on trade costs, fixed establishment costs, productivity and market demand. Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2003) develop this distinction in their analysis of exports versus FDI, subsequently published in 2004. A firm able to spread the fixed costs of an affiliate across large sales may find foreign production attractive. Firms with different productivity and scale need not respond identically to the same jurisdiction.

Location also changes the accessibility of labor skills, suppliers, infrastructure and markets. A specialized supplier network can lower coordination costs and improve learning. A market with accumulated expertise can sustain activities that would be expensive to recreate elsewhere. A legal or fiscal incentive changes only one component of the firm's expected return. Its practical effect depends on the availability of complementary resources and the costs of coordination across borders.

Different corporate functions require different combinations of those resources. A factory may depend on transport connections, industrial land and reliable energy. A regional headquarters requires experienced managers, communications and business services. An R&D facility depends more directly on specialized workers and knowledge networks. A financing vehicle may require smaller physical premises but substantial financial expertise, access to counterparties and organizational authority. International capital flows reflect these heterogeneous production conditions.

The fixed costs of internal organization create an interaction between corporate boundaries and geographical boundaries. When activities are performed by independent suppliers, the contractual and production locations may diverge without a relocation of employees within the multinational. When an activity is internalized, its costs and assets may become visible to the group's reporting system. Consolidation then alters the statistical presentation of flows without erasing the economic activity carried out by the subsidiaries or suppliers.

The inference is that substance policy must be evaluated against the firm's actual production and organizational alternatives. It can influence a decision to establish a foreign affiliate, the allocation of tasks among existing affiliates, the choice between internal and external service provision, and the closure of a subsidiary. These margins are related, but a requirement that changes one need not change the others in the same direction.

Taxes, investment margins and location choice

Corporate income taxation changes the present value of an investment's after-tax returns. Differences in statutory rates, tax bases, depreciation, deductions, credits and the treatment of cross-border income shape the effective tax burden. The economic significance of a nominal tax rate therefore depends on the structure of the investment, its expected profitability, and the interaction of the relevant tax systems.

Devereux and Griffith (2003) examine tax policy for location decisions and the distinction between effective tax measures. For a discrete choice among mutually exclusive locations, average tax burdens on a profitable project matter; marginal effective tax measures address the incentive to expand an investment at the margin. Neither measure should be treated as a complete description of the business environment. The choice between building a factory in two countries differs from choosing the size of an existing factory.

Their earlier study of production location (Devereux & Griffith, 1998) examines US multinationals and distinguishes the decision to produce in Europe from the choice of country conditional on European production. It reports tax effects on the latter margin and emphasizes the importance of agglomeration. That distinction limits the inference: estimated differences between European locations cannot directly predict whether firms will expand their total worldwide production.

The standard present-value reasoning is sufficient to explain the basic mechanism. Suppose alternative locations yield expected pretax operating surpluses P_A and P_B, tax burdens T_A and T_B, and establishment and adjustment costs C_A and C_B, all expressed as present values. With these simplified quantities, the enterprise compares P_A − T_A − C_A and P_B − T_B − C_B. Location B is preferred when the second amount exceeds the first. The comparison incorporates tax differences alongside productive advantages and resource relocation costs; it creates no new named theoretical model.

A hypothetical calculation illustrates the distinction. If A provides pretax surplus of 120 and tax of 30, while B provides 105 and tax of 10, the returns before relocation costs are 90 and 95. A relocation cost of 8 reduces the B return to 87. A tax advantage of 20 therefore coexists with a preference for A because the productive surplus and fixed costs differ. If the firm can move only a financial claim at a lower cost while retaining production in A, the problem changes, and the applicable legal and fiscal constraints become essential.

This arithmetic illustrates why the measured elasticity of reported profit can be different from the elasticity of real capital investment. The costs that govern the two choices differ. A policy linking favorable tax treatment to performance of activities increases the cost of separating the margins, but it may also increase the reward to moving productive capabilities. The resulting response depends on the firm and on the alternatives available in the international system.

Economic substance and the organization of functions

The concept of substance becomes economically useful when linked to identifiable functions, resources and responsibility. Employees provide labor and knowledge; assets enable production and service delivery; decision authority integrates these resources into a business process. Contracts establish obligations and the allocation of claims. A corporate entity's contribution depends on the functions it performs and on the relationships through which it performs them.

The OECD (2022) transfer pricing guidelines provide an internationally influential reference for analysis of related-party dealings, including transactions involving intangibles and finance. Functional analysis concerns the economic characteristics of arrangements, rather than relying exclusively on internal contractual labels. Transfer pricing and legal substance requirements are related institutional questions, but they are not identical assessments. The former concerns allocation and valuation of transactions between associated enterprises; the latter may condition entitlement to a tax treatment or compliance under specific rules.

A workforce count is meaningful when matched to functions. Staff who execute routine administrative tasks differ in their responsibilities from staff who make consequential decisions about investment, financing or innovation. A large workforce may provide essential operational services even if it does not determine strategic policy. A small professional team may undertake substantial transactions relative to headcount. An investigator should assess qualification, responsibility, working time and operational continuity as well as numbers.

The same qualification applies to physical assets. Infrastructure may be leased, shared or owned, and some activities require little tangible capital. Expenditure can capture both direct production inputs and purchases from independent providers. Outsourcing may represent a genuine use of local resources, but the geographical interpretation requires knowledge of where the contracted work is actually performed. Payment to a local contractor does not by itself establish that all underlying services are local.

Decision-making adds a more difficult observational issue. Board minutes, delegated authority, communication records and the execution of business policy are possible evidence of actual management. A formal meeting records a corporate event; the economic significance of the event depends on whether the participants possess authority, information and the practical capacity to make the relevant decision. These elements may be distributed across countries even within one management team.

A proportionate analysis therefore begins with the economic activity. For manufacturing, equipment utilization, production hours and supply-chain integration may carry substantial explanatory weight. For treasury, the relevant evidence may involve staff qualifications, actual coordination of liquidity, and risk management capacity. For ownership of passive investments, the required organizational resources can be smaller than for development and commercialization of new technology. The local wage bill and the amount of capital under management answer different questions and should not be collapsed into a single universal benchmark.

Offshore entities and the separation of claims from production

Offshore finance provides institutional arrangements through which firms and other asset owners hold investments, organize financing, manage risk and transfer claims across borders. The resulting entities differ substantially in function. Some coordinate operating relationships and financial services; others route funds or hold claims on assets located elsewhere. Classification requires examining balance sheets, counterparties, employment and the ultimate destination of funds.

Desai, Foley, and Hines (2006) study demand for tax haven operations among US multinational firms. Their research associates haven operations with larger and more internationally active firms and examines connections with activities outside havens. This evidence supports an interpretation of haven entities as parts of broader organizational structures. It does not establish that every such entity causes an increase or decline in worldwide real investment, or that a particular offshore entity violates tax law.

The capacity to separate financial ownership from the place of production can be economically useful. A group may centralize financing and provide liquidity to subsidiaries. A single ownership vehicle may coordinate governance across projects. These arrangements can also produce complex cross-border income allocation. The economic question concerns actual functions, location incentives and consequences, not an automatic judgment based on the jurisdiction of incorporation.

The implications of an intermediary structure depend on the direction of the counterfactual. Eliminating an intermediary may reduce administrative costs in one case and increase external financing costs in another. Strengthening substance conditions may lead a group to build an operating service center, use an existing appropriately staffed unit elsewhere, or simplify its legal structure. The resulting geography of capital claims may change much more or much less than the geography of employment.

A central analytical distinction follows: corporate financial connectivity and local productive contribution are distinct properties of the same structure. High connectivity can coexist with low local employment; a manufacturing region can support high production while holding relatively few international financial claims. Offshore specialization is economically intelligible only when both properties are examined.

The institutional evolution of substantial activity requirements

International economic substance policy emerged from concerns about the relationship between favorable tax treatment and the location of income-generating activity. The OECD (2019) review of harmful tax practices documents the development of the substantial-activities framework, including the evolution of the original tax-haven criteria and subsequent reconsideration of no or nominal tax jurisdictions.

The 2015 BEPS Action 5 report (OECD, 2015) establishes distinct approaches to substance in preferential regimes. For qualifying intellectual property regimes, the nexus approach connects benefits to qualifying expenditure related to development of the intellectual property. For other relevant regimes, the substantial-activities assessment emphasizes performance of the core income-generating activities. The economic purpose is to link favorable treatment more closely to the actual activity from which eligible income arises.

The later framework extends substantial-activities reasoning to relevant activity in jurisdictions with no or nominal corporate income taxation. The institutional design recognizes variation among functions and sectors. A requirement conceived for a large manufacturing operation cannot be indiscriminately applied to every holding or financing arrangement. The administrative criteria and the economic intensity of the underlying activity remain distinct.

Two official jurisdictional portals provide concrete institutional evidence without supporting a universal legal checklist. The Cayman Islands' economic substance portal identifies the regime as effective from January 2019 and describes its international context. The Government of Jersey's substance guidance portal makes information available for companies and partnerships. These sources establish the existence of jurisdictional implementation and categories of administrative guidance; they are not a consolidated legislative comparison or an individualized legal opinion.

International monitoring is yet another evidence layer. In February 2026 the OECD's Action 5 monitoring announcement reported the results of its fifth annual substantial-activities monitoring round, conducted in November 2025. Monitoring conclusions describe implementation against the relevant standards at a stated date. They do not independently establish how many jobs were created, whether gross fixed capital formation increased, or whether a change in revenues was caused by the regime.

The economic mechanism proceeds through changes in conditional returns. When a preferential treatment is available only if qualifying operations are performed, a firm must compare the additional value of that treatment with the cost of meeting the relevant requirements. Factors such as local labor markets, administrative uncertainty and existing facilities affect the comparison. The jurisdiction's ability to supply complementary resources can matter more than the formal adoption of a requirement alone.

Intellectual property, research and the location of innovation

Intangible assets provide a particularly important example of distributed economic functions. A patent is a legal right. Research involves workers, experimental expenditure, facilities and knowledge. Commercial application requires complementary inputs, and exploitation generates income from sales, licenses or related transactions. The ownership of the right and the research process can be situated in different places, even when they form part of one economic project.

The nexus approach changes the relation between advantageous taxation of qualifying IP income and the expenditure associated with developing the asset. Under the institutional arrangements described in the OECD's Action 5 report (2015), qualifying expenditure serves as a proxy linking benefits to substantive activity. The proxy is activity-specific, and it does not measure the entirety of innovation or the economic value of all associated knowledge. It provides an administrable means of conditioning treatment.

Alstadsæter et al. (2018) study patent boxes and local R&D using data on large research-intensive firms. Their results distinguish responsiveness of patent location from the location of underlying inventive activity and examine the relevance of regime design. The distinction is fundamental. A new patent registration or transfer into a jurisdiction may reflect a change in ownership or legal protection, whereas a change in inventor location more directly concerns the geography of innovative labor. Both can be economically consequential, but their empirical interpretation differs.

Shehaj and Weichenrieder (2024) examine corporate taxes and R&D location. Their analysis identifies a mechanism through which a higher ordinary corporate income tax rate can improve the value of deductions for research costs even when returns are partly taxed at lower rates under IP regimes or accrue elsewhere in the multinational. Their empirical analysis of US-owned foreign subsidiaries supports the positive ordinary-tax effect in countries with IP regimes. This result concerns the conditional interaction of ordinary and preferential taxation, rather than an unconditional claim that higher corporate taxes increase all R&D.

These studies use different outcomes and samples. They should not be pooled as estimates of a single patent-box elasticity. One reason for their differing findings is that the cost of performing research and the tax treatment of returns to successful intellectual property can move independently. Firms choose where to generate knowledge and where to own the resulting rights under both sets of incentives.

A policy evaluation should consequently follow the activities through time. At the start, research teams and facilities may remain in existing locations. Legal transfers can occur before, after, or without migration of employees. New research projects may be allocated differently from existing projects. Only longitudinal observation can separate the movement of existing capabilities from the creation of additional capabilities. Patent counts, patent ownership, inventor addresses, R&D expenses and employment provide complementary evidence.

Financing, ownership and the role of management

The organization of corporate finance presents a different form of location choice. A treasury center can coordinate internal funding, foreign exchange exposures and group liquidity. A holding entity can own claims on operating subsidiaries. A special-purpose vehicle can perform a defined contractual financing operation. These activities are distinct from industrial production and have different input requirements.

Financial arrangements affect the allocation of risk, capital and income among corporate entities. A group can route finance through an intermediary without relocating factories or engineers. The economic presence of the intermediary nevertheless depends on the resources it deploys and on its effective responsibilities. Financing volume is a measure of contractual claims, not a direct measure of labor performed in the intermediary economy.

The OECD transfer pricing guidelines (2022) include treatment of financial transactions and intangibles within the wider international principles for associated-enterprise transactions. A study of location should distinguish the contractual allocation of financing from the operational capacity to make and implement financial decisions. It should also identify whether an activity belongs to the intermediary itself or is undertaken by an external service provider.

A decision to relocate a treasury center could involve several changes. Existing bank accounts and intercompany loans may be novated. Personnel may be transferred or recruited. New governance procedures may be adopted. Local access to foreign exchange markets, financial technology and professional services may influence the expected cost of the operation. The economic impact depends on the combination and timing of these changes.

The analysis of holding and financing vehicles therefore requires proportionate expectations. The investigator must establish the function before judging its resource intensity. Even a function with limited local workforce can generate demand for specialized services. Yet a large reported investment position may have modest local employment effects when its principal underlying assets and obligations are abroad.

Corporate location under substance requirements

A substance requirement changes the feasible set of arrangements or the conditions under which favorable tax treatment is obtained. It can make an existing configuration more costly without physically prohibiting a company from locating there. The firm's response can include paying the ordinary tax, relocating eligible activities, closing a vehicle, contracting for permissible services or changing the structure of business relationships. Which options are legally available depends on the applicable rules.

Singh, Kallen, and Mathur (2020) investigate substance requirements and intangible capital and identify the possibility of a policy-induced relocation of real activity. This insight qualifies the simple assumption that linking profit to substance necessarily restores activities to their historical locations. If the tax benefit available in a jurisdiction is large enough relative to the cost of moving relevant personnel or functions, the activity itself can become mobile. Their study provides analytical evidence, not a universal causal estimate of actual economic substance regimes.

Consider a hypothetical group whose productive team is in A and whose IP ownership is in B. Before a reform, the separation is possible at a given cost. After a reform, favorable treatment in B requires that a specified proportion of relevant development activity be connected to B under the applicable rules. The group can retain the team in A and lose some benefits; shift new work to B if local resources and the rules permit; or reorganize ownership and taxation without migrating the team. The social and fiscal outcomes depend on the chosen alternative.

Another possible response is the establishment of genuinely productive regional service centers. Hiring local specialists might satisfy an operational need and increase the certainty of taxation at the same time. Where personnel are scarce, the demand generated by several groups can raise wages, draw employees from domestic businesses or increase reliance on migration. Incremental wages are not automatically incremental national income of the same size because workers and other inputs have alternative uses.

There is also an extensive-margin response: some entities disappear. Their former legal or financial positions may be moved to an operating subsidiary, distributed to investors or unwound. A decline in registrations can signify structural simplification, reduced attractiveness, or both. It gives limited information on the corresponding local value added unless the scale of displaced services and their alternatives are measured.

The authorial synthesis is that policy changes the relative costs of maintaining the geographical alignment of functions, legal rights and taxable income. Its effects are governed jointly by the profitability of the underlying activity, the mobility of each organizational resource and the availability of competing jurisdictions. This conclusion follows from standard economic reasoning and the literature, without claiming a new named theory.

Minimum taxation and substance-based income exclusions

Minimum-tax rules introduce another dimension of international location incentives. The OECD (2021) Pillar Two model rules establish a minimum effective rate of 15 percent for in-scope groups through a coordinated system addressing excess profits. The model framework includes a substance-based income exclusion associated with eligible payroll and tangible assets. Jurisdictional implementation, transitional rules and other adjustments are relevant to any practical calculation.

The existence of a substance-based exclusion is economically significant because the location of real resources can influence the amount of income exposed to top-up taxation. It does not imply that all material economic activity is measured by eligible payroll and tangible assets. Research-intensive digital enterprises and financial service providers may use valuable organizational and intangible resources that are represented differently in the rule's calculations.

A stylized example isolates the mechanism and omits jurisdiction-specific exclusions, safe harbors, timing adjustments, special entities and the detailed ordering of rules. Assume a jurisdictional income measure of 100, covered taxes of 5, and a substance-based exclusion amount of 20. The simplified effective tax rate is 5 percent; the gap to the minimum rate is 10 percentage points; excess profits are 80. Multiplying 0.10 by 80 gives a stylized top-up amount of 8. If the exclusion amount instead equals 30 with income and covered taxes unchanged, the same multiplication gives 7. The illustration explains a feature of the model framework, not the amount payable by an actual group.

Minimum taxation may reduce the benefit of moving profits to some low-tax locations, but relative returns can still depend on ordinary taxes, the composition of actual business resources, and treatments outside the simplified model. A minimum-tax mechanism also interacts with existing preferential-regime and substantial-activities requirements. A jurisdiction may respond by adjusting its mix of taxes, infrastructure investment, government expenditure or other policy instruments.

Policy analysis should distinguish the response of the tax base from the response of real investment. An observed rise in effective tax payments in a low-tax jurisdiction may occur without any relocation of production. Conversely, adjustment of real capital and employment may be gradual even if reporting changes quickly. The direction of national revenue changes also depends on which jurisdiction collects additional tax and on subsequent changes in corporate behavior.

Foreign direct investment and pass-through capital

Foreign direct investment is a statistical category describing specified cross-border investment relationships. Its magnitude can reflect operating enterprises, acquisitions, reorganizations, intercompany financing and the intermediate routing of claims. These transactions have different implications for the host country's productive capacity.

The OECD (2025) fifth FDI benchmark definition emphasizes more informative classifications, including the purpose of investment, pass-through funds and the ultimate investor or host economy. These developments respond to the difficulty of interpreting gross cross-border investment records when ownership and financing traverse multiple jurisdictions. A consistent statistical account requires identifying which transactions and positions are measured, with what valuation, and from whose perspective.

Damgaard, Elkjaer, and Johannesen's (2019) global FDI network study estimates that almost 40 percent of global FDI positions in 2017 represented phantom investment associated with intermediary entities rather than direct links to local real investment. This is a historical decomposition of investment positions; it is not an estimate of the same fraction of global annual flows, illicit capital or tax evasion. The term reflects the statistical-economic classification used in the study, not a legal adjudication of each position.

For example, suppose an investor in A supplies 100 of cross-border equity to a vehicle in B, which invests the same amount in an operator in C. A simplified immediate-location account records two international investment relationships of 100; the economic project in C still has funding of 100. The vehicle in B may provide legitimate services with separately measurable costs and value added. Adding both positions and interpreting the result as productive capital created in B and C would misstate the underlying arrangement.

A relocation of the intermediary from B to D changes the reported immediate investment geography. It need not change the project's location in C or the ultimate investor in A. The move may change financing costs and local professional service demand in B and D. These impacts are measurable but distinct from a movement of the production facility.

The empirical strategy is therefore to decompose the financial chain before relating investment records to output, jobs or wages. Ultimate-investor information helps identify ownership; ultimate-host information helps trace downstream investment; establishment-level data locate production; sectoral balance sheets help explain intermediaries. Residual discrepancies should be reported rather than assigned to a presumed location of economic activity.

Country-by-country information and measurement

International taxation generates reporting information about the distribution of multinational assets, profits, employment and taxes. Country-by-country reporting can support analysis of differences between where groups report profits and where they employ workers or hold tangible assets. The level of aggregation and the purpose of the reporting system shape the interpretation of the results.

The OECD's (2026) country-by-country reporting statistics describe aggregates based on 2023 fiscal-year information and include indicators of employment, tangible assets, profit and tax. The publication explains limitations arising from differences in reporting practices and data aggregation. It also identifies the prevalence of holding activities in investment hubs. These features make the information useful for comparison but insufficient to establish the economic substance or legal position of an individual entity.

A descriptive indicator such as profit before tax divided by employment can reveal unusually high reported profits per employee. The numerator and denominator may have different coverage and economic timing. Losses or near-zero employment make ratios unstable; capital intensity, commodity prices, financial intermediation and intellectual property ownership can generate legitimate differences. An indicator is therefore a starting point for investigation rather than a standalone conclusion.

The same holds for profits relative to tangible assets. The expected return per unit of measured assets depends on the composition of the business. An intangible-intensive group can produce substantial value with limited tangible property. A group whose assets are valued at historical cost may appear more profitable relative to recorded capital than a comparable group with recently acquired assets. Cross-jurisdiction comparisons require harmonized definitions and sensitivity analysis.

A robust descriptive investigation would assemble entity identifiers, corporate-group ownership information, jurisdictional tax data, balance sheets, employment and expenditure. It would distinguish employees directly reported by the group from contractors and compare the roles of legal entity, establishment and tax-reporting aggregate. It would also document missing values, confidentiality suppression, valuation changes and currency conversion. Where restricted access prevents linkage, the limitation should be visible in the final interpretation.

The empirical significance of the discrepancy between reported profits and real activity is illustrated by Tørsløv, Wier, and Zucman (2023), whose Missing Profits of Nations estimates that 36 percent of multinational profits are shifted to tax havens in their study setting. This is an estimate of multinational profits shifted, rather than a share of all corporate profits or a 2026 current-year statistic. Its aggregate significance supports investigation of the separation between income attribution and economic activity, while leaving entity-specific judgments to other evidence.

Causal inference and the evaluation of regulatory change

A causal evaluation asks how firms and jurisdictions would have behaved in the absence of a particular change. Before-and-after comparisons can document the actual trajectory, but concurrent events may account for part of the change. International reforms frequently coincide with changes in interest rates, corporate taxation, disclosure, enforcement and global demand.

A treatment must first be defined. A new substance rule could apply to only some activities, entities or jurisdictions. The relevant date may be enactment, entry into force, the expiration of a transition period or actual enforcement. Announcements can trigger anticipatory behavior. A comparison between all entities in two jurisdictions can dilute the treatment effect if most entities are unaffected.

Difference-in-differences methods can compare outcomes for affected and less affected enterprises across time, provided the identifying assumptions are credible. Pre-reform trends, group composition, differential exposure to other reforms and anticipation merit examination. Staggered adoption requires attention to heterogeneous treatment timing and effects. Event-study plots can help reveal dynamics and pre-trends, but informative plots alone cannot rule out every confounder.

An alternative design exploits a discontinuity in tax or regulatory treatment at a threshold. Hansen, Merlo, and Wamser (2023) investigate corporate tax notches related to controlled foreign corporation taxation and examine both profit relocation and associated changes in real activity. Their working-paper evidence indicates relocation toward alternative low-tax affiliates, with corresponding activity responses. This is evidence about the studied tax-notch setting, not direct evidence of a universal effect of economic substance laws.

Threshold analysis requires special care. Firms may manipulate the running variable, choose locations in anticipation of the threshold, or face other regulations at related cutoffs. Estimates near the threshold may have limited generalizability to entities far from it. Moreover, a jurisdiction-specific outcome can miss displacement of activity to a third country.

A multinational network creates interference between treatment and comparison groups. If a reform increases the cost of operating in one jurisdiction, a group may increase investment in an alternative jurisdiction that would otherwise serve as the control. Analysis at the group level, exposure-based designs, and explicit observation of other affiliates can help identify diversion. The appropriate outcome should include changes in employment, investment, and profit at multiple locations, rather than only departures from the initially affected location.

A comprehensive evaluation should report descriptive trends and causal estimates separately. Compliance rates, new entity counts and administrative decisions are indicators of implementation; employment or investment responses are economic outcomes. The estimated effect of a narrowly defined reform in a specific cohort does not identify worldwide welfare consequences without additional assumptions and evidence.

A comparative empirical research design

A defensible empirical study of substantive corporate location would begin with a defined cohort of multinational groups and stable enterprise identifiers. The observation unit could be the group-jurisdiction-year for broad location allocation, supplemented by entity-year and establishment-year data where available. Financial ownership chains and the geographic location of each establishment would be reconciled before estimation.

The researcher would classify entities by economically relevant activities prior to the reform, avoiding a classification based only on subsequent behavior. Treatment exposure would depend on documented eligibility and changes in the applicable institutional conditions. The empirical record would distinguish new incorporations, entity exits, intra-group transfers and changes in existing operating scale.

The outcome dimensions should be reported in parallel:

Dimension Candidate observation Major interpretation limit
Productive operations Employment, wage bill, operating expenditure, physical investment Outsourcing, price changes, sectoral composition
Organizational functions Responsibility of personnel, decision authority, recurring local service use Delegation, remote work, confidentiality
Income attribution Profit before tax, royalties, financing income, tax paid Accounting rules, loss years, transfer pricing, timing
Financial geography Gross and net FDI positions, ultimate ownership, funding destination Pass-through, valuation, intra-group transactions
Dynamic behavior Entry, exit, new projects, relocation, entity reorganization Survivorship, anticipation, delayed reporting

The grouping of these dimensions is an evidentiary aid and does not establish a new index of substance. Their applicability differs across activities. Analysts can compare normalized outcomes within narrowly defined sectors and report sensitivity to excluding holding entities, financial enterprises, very large groups and negative-profit observations.

In a proposed difference-in-differences design, establishments affected by a verified institutional change would be compared with observationally comparable establishments in unaffected activities or jurisdictions. Estimates for employment, capital expenditure and profit would be reported separately, with uncertainty intervals and robust treatment timing. Affiliate-level links could then show whether losses in the initially affected jurisdiction were offset by gains elsewhere in the same group. This is a research specification for future implementation on appropriate data, not an executed statistical study.

Validation would involve reconciling observed changes with corporate announcements and, where available, annual accounts or administrative decisions. A sample of specific entities could be independently coded for the actual work performed. Disclosure restrictions must be respected. Public anonymized aggregates can be used to validate broad distributions without attempting to identify confidential taxpayers.

The design would produce answers at multiple scales. A jurisdiction-level net change describes its aggregate outcomes. A group-level change helps identify displacement and consolidation. Sector-level estimates reveal whether resource requirements and tax incentives interact differently in research, manufacturing and finance. The world-level effect requires further aggregation and adjustment to avoid counting the same economic activity in several countries.

Economic incidence, adjustment and welfare

An economic assessment of substance policy should measure changes in productive capacity, public revenue and resource allocation. It must also account for the alternative uses of the resources mobilized. A newly employed worker receives wages, but the national value of that employment depends partly on whether the worker would otherwise have been unemployed, employed domestically, or working abroad.

Corporate relocation affects multiple groups. Owners and investors bear some changes in after-tax returns; workers may receive new opportunities or face displacement; suppliers may gain or lose clients; governments incur administrative expenditure and receive taxes or fees. The distribution of gains can diverge from their aggregate magnitude. National welfare and worldwide welfare can also diverge when investment is redirected across borders.

The economic cost of a required activity includes the opportunity cost of labor and capital, compliance expenditure and any lost productivity caused by separation from complementary networks. Some changes may create positive value if they induce more effective management, reduce uncertain tax structures, or support an efficient local specialization. Others may consume real resources primarily to preserve a financial advantage. Determining which situation applies requires knowledge of the counterfactual.

Consider a hypothetical reform that induces 20 of annual local expenditure in a small economy and reduces an associated tax advantage by 10. If 15 of the expenditure substitutes for existing domestic productive activity at comparable value, the gross expenditure figure overstates the increment to local output. If it instead draws idle resources into work and supports additional services, more of the gross amount may be incremental. The calculation cannot be completed from the expenditure figure alone; it requires a comparison with alternative employment and production.

Public-revenue evaluation has similar difficulties. Revenue that is collected in a host economy may be diverted from another government or collected on activity that would otherwise not occur. A reduction in measured offshore profit does not itself identify the receiving jurisdiction or the total change in government revenue. Some groups may reduce their investment, others may restructure, and still others may increase productive presence.

The appropriate welfare comparison is therefore between specific feasible policy arrangements. It should include the expected effects of behavioral responses, the opportunity costs of resources, distributional consequences and the cost of administration. Assertions that substance rules always increase or decrease global welfare are unsupported by the selected evidence. A stronger conclusion concerns the mechanisms that make either outcome possible.

Small economies and the capacity to supply substance

Small jurisdictions specializing in international corporate services often have limited domestic labor pools and land. Their ability to support substantive activity depends on the quality and availability of professional skills, infrastructure, housing, transportation, communications and public administration. Internationally mobile labor and external service relationships may expand this capacity, subject to immigration and other relevant policies.

An expansion of local financial or business-service operations can increase the demand for specialized workers and suppliers. When capacity is elastic, local activities can grow through investment and hiring. When it is inelastic, a surge in demand can raise rents and salaries, draw personnel from other industries and constrain domestic services. The real benefit of additional corporate expenditure depends on these general-equilibrium effects.

Substance requirements can influence the competitive position of jurisdictions by altering the costs of serving foreign clients. An economy that previously specialized in entity registration may invest in professional training and infrastructure to support a broader range of corporate activities. A jurisdiction with established high-quality business services may be better placed to attract operations that require specialized expertise. Adjustment does not necessarily preserve the old geographical distribution of financial positions.

A comparative study should trace the composition of activity before and after the policy change. Employment by occupation, real wages, population, housing costs, service exports, value added and public revenues offer information about development outcomes. These indicators should be considered alongside changes in entity registrations and financial assets, with suitable external comparisons.

Substance policy also interacts with economic resilience. A jurisdiction heavily dependent on a narrow range of foreign corporate activities can be exposed to exogenous regulatory shifts. Diversification may reduce that exposure, but changing specialization takes time and requires complementary investments. An assessment of successful adaptation should therefore include the persistence of local skills and business capabilities, rather than assuming that higher registration counts imply durable development.

Synthesis: alignment, mobility and policy assessment

Corporate location is best understood as the allocation of interdependent functions within a geographically distributed organization. Legal ownership, fiscal attribution and real activity each have a location, and organizational decisions may move them together or separately. Tax and regulatory institutions influence the returns to each configuration.

The research examined here supports several conclusions of different epistemic strength. Studies of international production and effective taxation establish the importance of fixed costs, heterogeneous firms and the margin of decision. The statistical standards and FDI decomposition evidence establish why financial positions require interpretation before they can be used as indicators of productive investment. Research on IP regimes shows that the location of rights and the location of research respond to potentially different incentives. Tax-notch evidence and analysis of substance requirements identify the possibility that policies intended to affect the allocation of profits can also redistribute real functions.

The unifying interpretation is an asymmetric adjustment process. Changes in financial claims and accounting structures may occur relatively quickly, while the relocation of workers, capabilities and physical capital can require years. The sequence may differ among firms and activities. A short-term observed fall in one country's reported investments may therefore be compatible with unchanged local production; subsequent evidence may reveal an adjustment in real functions.

This interpretation has immediate implications for policy evaluation. First, the assessment should identify the specific activity and the conditions under which benefits are available. Second, it should measure location at the level appropriate to the outcome. Third, it should allow for responses in other jurisdictions connected through multinational groups. Fourth, it should distinguish the cost of compliance from the cost and benefit of changes in genuine productive activity. Finally, it should compare changes to a credible alternative trajectory, rather than reading causal effects directly from administrative totals.

The evidence is strongest for the presence of multiple margins and for the inadequacy of a single financial statistic as a measure of local production. The evidence is less comprehensive for the long-term global welfare effect of recent combinations of substance rules, minimum taxation and national responses. That question requires harmonized longitudinal evidence, including resource mobility and third-country effects.

The analytical contribution of this dossier lies in the integration of the economic, institutional and statistical distinctions within a single account of location. It makes explicit why a policy can reduce the separation between income and economic activity while simultaneously creating incentives to move the activity itself. These are logically consistent consequences. Their relative importance is an empirical question, and no independent theoretical priority is asserted.

Conclusion

Economic substance and corporate location are connected through the organization of resources and responsibility in multinational enterprises. Economic substance describes actual performance of functions in a jurisdiction; corporate location identifies the distribution of the relevant components of a business across economies. The distinction permits rigorous interpretation of legal presence, employment, assets, management, financial claims and taxable income.

The modern offshore system enables these components to be distributed internationally. Its economic effects cannot be inferred from a registered address, the amount of a gross investment position, or the magnitude of reported profit alone. Each of these records describes an economically significant relationship whose interpretation depends on the underlying activity and ownership structure.

Substantial-activities requirements seek to strengthen the connection between favorable treatment and actual operations. The policy changes the return to different configurations of the multinational enterprise. Its consequences can include real investment, relocation, simplification, higher tax payments or substitution among jurisdictions. Research on intellectual property and corporate tax notches demonstrates why a continuing analysis of actual functions is essential.

The appropriate evaluation integrates statistical decomposition, functional evidence, and causal analysis. It distinguishes historical estimates from current conditions, group-wide responses from jurisdiction-specific outcomes, and gross financial transactions from newly created productive capital. It also assesses the welfare consequences of changes in resource use rather than treating nominal inflows or local expenditure as sufficient evidence of economic gains.

A comprehensive assessment of global corporate location thus requires a geographically resolved account of actual economic functions, their associated contractual and financial relationships, and the policy environment under which the enterprise makes its decisions. This is the basis for understanding both the economic significance of offshore structures and the consequences of policies that seek to connect income more closely to substantive activity.

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